Assertion is weak
Philosophers' Imprint · 2022
DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1076 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophers' Imprint, 2022. Verfasst von Matthew Mandelkern und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 17-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 90 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) belief---perhaps knowledge or even certainty. We argue that this is wrong: assertion is just as weak as belief. We first present a variety of new arguments for this, and then show that the standard arguments for stronger norms are not convincing. Finally, we sketch an alternative picture on which the fundamental norm of assertion is to say what you believe, but both belief and assertion are weak. To help make sense of this, we propose that both belief and assertion involve navigating a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity, and so it can makes sense to believe/say something you only have weak evidence for, if it is informative enough.
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APA
Mandelkern, M., & Dorst, K. (2022). Assertion is weak. Philosophers' Imprint. https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1076
Vancouver
Mandelkern M, Dorst K. Assertion is weak. Philosophers' Imprint. 2022. doi:10.3998/phimp.1076
BibTeX
@article{Mandelkern2022,
author = {Mandelkern, Matthew and Dorst, Kevin},
title = {Assertion is weak},
journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.3998/phimp.1076}
}
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