In Defence of Robust Rights for All Sentient Creatures
Journal of Practical Ethics · 02.11.2026 · 13 (2)
DOI: 10.3998/jpe.10746 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Practical Ethics, online erschienen am 02.11.2026. Verfasst von Angie Pepper. Die Arbeit nennt 6 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Jonathan Birch's 'Ethics for a Large Sentient World' presents a novel approach to the challenges associated with granting sentient insects direct moral concern. The Gandhian-inspired ethic that Birch develops takes insect sentience seriously while maintaining that insects have no right not to be harmed when harming them is necessary to secure human and nonhuman animal health and agricultural benefits. This paper offers a critical response to Birch's framework. I begin by arguing that Birch misinterprets the challenge facing a robust rights-based theory. I then show that his Gandhian alternative is not a genuine departure from a robust rights-based view but rather a specific, and ultimately unappealing, version of it. I show that Birch's view is unattractive because it holds that duties of care can function as exceptions to rights, which has problematic implications for all sentient beings, including humans.
Zitieren
APA
Pepper, A. (2026). In Defence of Robust Rights for All Sentient Creatures. Journal of Practical Ethics, 13(2). https://doi.org/10.3998/jpe.10746
Vancouver
Pepper A. In Defence of Robust Rights for All Sentient Creatures. Journal of Practical Ethics. 2026;13(2). doi:10.3998/jpe.10746
BibTeX
@article{Pepper2026,
author = {Pepper, Angie},
title = {In Defence of Robust Rights for All Sentient Creatures},
journal = {Journal of Practical Ethics},
year = {2026},
volume = {13},
number = {2},
doi = {10.3998/jpe.10746}
}
EUVIMED