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Prediction Impairs Deliberation

Gerard J. Rothfus

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 22.06.2026 · 13

DOI: 10.3998/ergo.9863 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 22.06.2026. Verfasst von Gerard J. Rothfus. Die Arbeit nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Causal decision theory has typically been discussed in contexts where agents adopt sharp credences of the sort adequately represented by a single probability measure. Under this assumption, causal decision theory is committed to a number of counterintuitive verdicts in cases involving decision instability. Many of these troubles lessen for sufficiently open-minded causalists who adopt maximally imprecise credences regarding their own acts. I suggest this provides novel pragmatic support for a version of the deliberation crowds out prediction thesis according to which rational agents’ act credences should generally be imprecise in this way, and then propose an appropriate decision rule for use by causalist agents with imprecise credences.

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APA

Rothfus, G. J. (2026). Prediction Impairs Deliberation. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 13(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.9863

Vancouver

Rothfus GJ. Prediction Impairs Deliberation. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2026;13(0). doi:10.3998/ergo.9863

BibTeX
@article{Rothfus2026,
  author = {Rothfus, Gerard J.},
  title = {Prediction Impairs Deliberation},
  journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {13},
  number = {0},
  doi = {10.3998/ergo.9863}
}
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