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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Conflicting Intuitions

Joshua Knobe

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 02.03.2026 · 13

DOI: 10.3998/ergo.9262 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 02.03.2026. Verfasst von Joshua Knobe. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Research on intuitions about philosophical thought experiments shows a striking pattern. Often, there are powerful intuitions on one side and also powerful intuitions on the exact opposite side. A question now arises about how to understand this pattern. One possible view would be that it is primarily a matter of different people having different intuitions. I present evidence for the view that this is not the correct understanding. Instead, I suggest, it is primarily a matter of individual people having conflicting intuitions. That is, it is primarily a matter of individual people having an intuition on one side and also having an intuition on the opposite side.

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APA

Knobe, J. (2026). Conflicting Intuitions. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 13(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.9262

Vancouver

Knobe J. Conflicting Intuitions. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2026;13(0). doi:10.3998/ergo.9262

BibTeX
@article{Knobe2026,
  author = {Knobe, Joshua},
  title = {Conflicting Intuitions},
  journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {13},
  number = {0},
  doi = {10.3998/ergo.9262}
}
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