Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 31.03.2023 · 9
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2277 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 31.03.2023. Verfasst von Joshua Shepherd und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We argue that any strong version of a knowledge condition on intentional action, the practical knowledge principle, on which knowledge of what I am doing (under some description: call it A-ing) is necessary for that A-ing to qualify as an intentional action, is false. Our argument involves a new kind of case, one that centers the agent’s control appropriately and thus improves upon Davidson’s well-known carbon copier case. After discussing this case, offering an initial argument against the knowledge condition, and discussing recent treatments that cover nearby ground, we consider several objections. One we consider at some length maintains that although contemplative knowledge may be disconnected from intentional action, specifically practical knowledge of the sort Anscombe elucidated escapes our argument. We demonstrate that this is not so. Our argument illuminates an important truth, often overlooked in discussions of the knowledge-intentional action relationship: intentional action and knowledge have different levels of permissiveness regarding failure in similar circumstances.
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APA
Shepherd, J., & Carter, J. A. (2023). Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 9(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2277
Vancouver
Shepherd J, Carter JA. Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2023;9(0). doi:10.3998/ergo.2277
BibTeX
@article{Shepherd2023,
author = {Shepherd, Joshua and Carter, J. Adam},
title = {Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Intentional Action},
journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2023},
volume = {9},
number = {0},
doi = {10.3998/ergo.2277}
}
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