Deontological Population Ethics: A Defence of the No-Difference View
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 2026
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.10987 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Jonas H. Aaron. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Themen: Ethik in der Pflege
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Suppose that the specific future individuals who will suffer from climate change still each have a good life overall. Our contributions to climate change will not harm these individuals in the sense that their lives will be overall bad as a result. Nor will our acts be worse for them. This is because these individuals will not exist at all if we do not contribute to climate change. Different individuals will exist, as even slight changes in our everyday lives lead to different sperm fertilizing different eggs. Because of this, some argue, our reasons not to inflict bad effects like suffering on future generations are weaker than they would be if our acts did not affect the identity of future people and were thus worse for them. By contrast, I defend the so-called No-Difference View: how objectionable it is to cause or allow a bad effect does not depend on whether the act is worse for someone relative to any available alternative. First, I defuse several striking counterexamples to the No-Difference View that have been proposed in the literature. Second, I offer a more precise formulation of a defensible No-Difference View. Third, I argue that there are good reasons to reject the view that it always makes a moral difference whether an act is worse for someone. Fourth, I answer the objection that the No-Difference View cannot be reconciled with the intuitive moral significance of individuals.
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APA
Aaron, J. H. (2026). Deontological Population Ethics: A Defence of the No-Difference View. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.10987
Vancouver
Aaron JH. Deontological Population Ethics: A Defence of the No-Difference View. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.3998/ergo.10987
BibTeX
@article{Aaron2026,
author = {Aaron, Jonas H.},
title = {Deontological Population Ethics: A Defence of the No-Difference View},
journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.3998/ergo.10987}
}
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