Binding Oneself
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · 2026
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.10354 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Janis David Schaab. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article advances three claims about the bindingness of duties to oneself: (1) To defend duties to oneself, one had better show that they can bind, i.e., provide normative reason to comply. (2) To salvage the bindingness of duties to oneself, one had better construe them as owed to, and waivable by, one’s present self. (3) Duties owed to, and waivable by, one’s present self can nevertheless bind. In advancing these claims, I partly oppose views recently developed by Daniel Muñoz and Paul Schofield. My arguments at least tentatively suggest three general lessons for moral theory: (a) Bindingness is an essential feature of duties in general. (b) The long sought-after explanation of supererogation is not to be found in waivable duties to oneself. (c) The bindingness of duties is a distinctive normative phenomenon which does not crucially depend on some physical, temporal, or psychological distance between the binding and the bound self.
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APA
Schaab, J. D. (2026). Binding Oneself. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.10354
Vancouver
Schaab JD. Binding Oneself. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.3998/ergo.10354
BibTeX
@article{Schaab2026,
author = {Schaab, Janis David},
title = {Binding Oneself},
journal = {Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.3998/ergo.10354}
}
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