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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs

Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille

Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1157-1188

DOI: 10.3982/te6927 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Jérôme Renault und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Israel Science Foundation.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always weakly higher than with public outcomes. Moreover, in pure equilibria, experimentation is never significantly below the socially optimal level and may be strictly higher. We provide a tight bound on the extent of over‐experimentation. The analysis rests on a novel encouragement effect.

Förderung

  • Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute
  • Agence Nationale de la Recherche
  • Israel Science Foundation
  • Fondation HEC

Zitieren

APA

Renault, J., Solan, E., & Vieille, N. (2026). Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1157-1188. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6927

Vancouver

Renault J, Solan E, Vieille N. Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1157-1188. doi:10.3982/te6927

BibTeX
@article{Renault2026,
  author = {Renault, Jérôme and Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas},
  title = {Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1157--1188},
  doi = {10.3982/te6927}
}
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