Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1157-1188
DOI: 10.3982/te6927 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Jérôme Renault und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Israel Science Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always weakly higher than with public outcomes. Moreover, in pure equilibria, experimentation is never significantly below the socially optimal level and may be strictly higher. We provide a tight bound on the extent of over‐experimentation. The analysis rests on a novel encouragement effect.
Förderung
- Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
- Israel Science Foundation
- Fondation HEC
Zitieren
APA
Renault, J., Solan, E., & Vieille, N. (2026). Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1157-1188. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6927
Vancouver
Renault J, Solan E, Vieille N. Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1157-1188. doi:10.3982/te6927
BibTeX
@article{Renault2026,
author = {Renault, Jérôme and Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas},
title = {Strategic experimentation with privately observed payoffs},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1157--1188},
doi = {10.3982/te6927}
}
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