Collaboration between and within groups
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1294-1330
DOI: 10.3982/te6680 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Matias Iaryczower und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Economic and Social Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the ability of multigroup teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare‐enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogeneous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two‐group team always completes the project strictly faster.
Förderung
- Economic and Social Research Council
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APA
Iaryczower, M., Oliveros, S., & Parihar, P. (2026). Collaboration between and within groups. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1294-1330. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6680
Vancouver
Iaryczower M, Oliveros S, Parihar P. Collaboration between and within groups. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1294-1330. doi:10.3982/te6680
BibTeX
@article{Iaryczower2026,
author = {Iaryczower, Matias and Oliveros, Santiago and Parihar, Parth},
title = {Collaboration between and within groups},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1294--1330},
doi = {10.3982/te6680}
}
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