Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (3) · 716-740
DOI: 10.3982/te6224 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Jeffrey C. Ely. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Nonpartisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on “the other side.” Indeed, when stuck in such a state of polarization, it is socially optimal to do so. Dynamics can lead an otherwise well‐functioning assembly into irreversible polarization. Reputation effects might only make things worse.
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APA
Ely, J. C. (2026). Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence. Theoretical Economics, 21(3), 716-740. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6224
Vancouver
Ely JC. Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(3):716-740. doi:10.3982/te6224
BibTeX
@article{Ely2026,
author = {Ely, Jeffrey C.},
title = {Ruth, Anthony, and Clarence},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {3},
pages = {716--740},
doi = {10.3982/te6224}
}
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