Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (1) · 99-131
DOI: 10.3982/te5974 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Elchanan Ben-Porath und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: National Science Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We explore two interrelated models of “hard information.” In the evidence‐acquisition model , an agent with private information searches for evidence to show the principal about her type. In the signal‐choice model , a privately informed agent chooses an action generating a random signal whose realization may be correlated with her type. The signal‐choice model is a special case, and as we show, under certain conditions, a reduced form of the evidence‐acquisition model. We develop tools for characterizing optimal mechanisms for these models by giving conditions under which some aspects of the principal's optimal choices can be identified only from the information structure, without regard to the utility functions or the principal's priors.
Förderung
- National Science Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Ben-Porath, E., Dekel, E., & Lipman, B. L. (2026). Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence. Theoretical Economics, 21(1), 99-131. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5974
Vancouver
Ben-Porath E, Dekel E, Lipman BL. Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(1):99-131. doi:10.3982/te5974
BibTeX
@article{BenPorath2026,
author = {Ben-Porath, Elchanan and Dekel, Eddie and Lipman, Barton L.},
title = {Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {99--131},
doi = {10.3982/te5974}
}
EUVIMED