How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (2) · 434-466
DOI: 10.3982/te5350 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Teddy Mekonnen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two‐sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into submarkets based on seller types. Such segmentation serves as a public signal that buyers use to direct their search. Given a segmentation, I characterize both the socially efficient and the equilibrium allocation of buyers across submarkets, and identify a Hosios‐type condition under which the equilibrium allocation is efficient. I then analyze the design of surplus‐maximizing segmentations, showing that the nature of search externalities determines when the constrained‐efficient segmentation fully separates seller types or pools them into at most a binary partition.
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APA
Mekonnen, T. (2026). How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search. Theoretical Economics, 21(2), 434-466. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5350
Vancouver
Mekonnen T. How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(2):434-466. doi:10.3982/te5350
BibTeX
@article{Mekonnen2026,
author = {Mekonnen, Teddy},
title = {How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
pages = {434--466},
doi = {10.3982/te5350}
}
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