EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search

Teddy Mekonnen

Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (2) · 434-466

DOI: 10.3982/te5350 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Teddy Mekonnen. Die Arbeit nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two‐sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into submarkets based on seller types. Such segmentation serves as a public signal that buyers use to direct their search. Given a segmentation, I characterize both the socially efficient and the equilibrium allocation of buyers across submarkets, and identify a Hosios‐type condition under which the equilibrium allocation is efficient. I then analyze the design of surplus‐maximizing segmentations, showing that the nature of search externalities determines when the constrained‐efficient segmentation fully separates seller types or pools them into at most a binary partition.

Zitieren

APA

Mekonnen, T. (2026). How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search. Theoretical Economics, 21(2), 434-466. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5350

Vancouver

Mekonnen T. How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(2):434-466. doi:10.3982/te5350

BibTeX
@article{Mekonnen2026,
  author = {Mekonnen, Teddy},
  title = {How to segment a search market: Information design and directed search},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {2},
  pages = {434--466},
  doi = {10.3982/te5350}
}
Kostenlos starten →