Slow persuasion
Theoretical Economics · 2023 · 18 (1) · 129-162
DOI: 10.3982/te5175 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2023. Verfasst von Matteo Escudé und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a “sender” provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel “viscosity” dynamic programming principle, we characterize the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less‐than‐full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.
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APA
Escudé, M., & Sinander, L. (2023). Slow persuasion. Theoretical Economics, 18(1), 129-162. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5175
Vancouver
Escudé M, Sinander L. Slow persuasion. Theoretical Economics. 2023;18(1):129-162. doi:10.3982/te5175
BibTeX
@article{Escud2023,
author = {Escudé, Matteo and Sinander, Ludvig},
title = {Slow persuasion},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {18},
number = {1},
pages = {129--162},
doi = {10.3982/te5175}
}
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