Digital currency and privacy
Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 19 (1) · 131-167
DOI: 10.3982/te5081 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2024. Verfasst von Kee-Youn Kang. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We develop a monetary model in which a private company issues digital currency and uses payment data to estimate consumers' preferences. Sellers purchase preference information to produce goods that better match consumers' preferences. A monopoly arises in the digital currency industry, and digital currency is not issued if the inflation rate is sufficiently high. Due to reinforcing interactions between the value of preference information and trade volume, multiple equilibria (with and without digital currency) can exist, depending on market structures for monetary exchanges. When left to market forces alone, socially efficient uses of payment data may not occur.
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APA
Kang, K. (2024). Digital currency and privacy. Theoretical Economics, 19(1), 131-167. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5081
Vancouver
Kang K. Digital currency and privacy. Theoretical Economics. 2024;19(1):131-167. doi:10.3982/te5081
BibTeX
@article{Kang2024,
author = {Kang, Kee-Youn},
title = {Digital currency and privacy},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {131--167},
doi = {10.3982/te5081}
}
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