The Social Learning Barrier
Econometrica · 2026 · 94 (6) · 1991-2024
DOI: 10.3982/ecta24769 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Econometrica, 2026. Verfasst von Florian Brandl. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Long‐lived agents interact repeatedly in a social network. In each period, each agent observes a private signal, chooses an action, and then observes the actions of her neighbors. We show that the learning rate of the slowest‐learning agent is capped by a constant that depends only on the distribution of the most informative private signal, but not on the number of agents, the network structure, correlations between the private signals, or the agents' strategies. For equilibrium learning with rational agents, the same result bounds the learning rate of every agent in any equilibrium under a broad class of conditions. The result is driven by an information‐theoretic tradeoff between optimal action choices and information revelation.
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APA
Brandl, F. (2026). The Social Learning Barrier. Econometrica, 94(6), 1991-2024. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta24769
Vancouver
Brandl F. The Social Learning Barrier. Econometrica. 2026;94(6):1991-2024. doi:10.3982/ecta24769
BibTeX
@article{Brandl2026,
author = {Brandl, Florian},
title = {The Social Learning Barrier},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = {2026},
volume = {94},
number = {6},
pages = {1991--2024},
doi = {10.3982/ecta24769}
}
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