Naturalistic Metaphysics and Metaphysical Realism
Revue de métaphysique et de morale · 17.07.2025 · N° 125 (2) · 223-237
DOI: 10.3917/e.rmm.252.0223 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revue de métaphysique et de morale, erschienen am 17.07.2025. Verfasst von Yazan Freij. Die Arbeit nennt 27 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A BSTRACT . – In this paper, I take two recent arguments in the literature against naturalistic metaphysics, that is, a metaphysics guided by our best science, and show that these arguments should be directed instead against metaphysical realism, which is roughly the view that our metaphysics aims to provide a unique and true account of the world out there. The first argument is the argument from progress which states that since metaphysical theories are not quantitative like scientific theories, they cannot inherit the progress from the scientific theories they are based upon. The second argument is the argument from metaphysical underdetermination which states that each scientific theory can be compatible with many metaphysical theories with no way to choose the true theory among them. These two arguments undermine metaphysical realism. As a result, I conclude that we ought to adopt instead a form of antirealistic metaphysics.
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APA
Freij, Y. (2025). Naturalistic Metaphysics and Metaphysical Realism. Revue de métaphysique et de morale, N° 125(2), 223-237. https://doi.org/10.3917/e.rmm.252.0223
Vancouver
Freij Y. Naturalistic Metaphysics and Metaphysical Realism. Revue de métaphysique et de morale. 2025;N° 125(2):223-237. doi:10.3917/e.rmm.252.0223
BibTeX
@article{Freij2025,
author = {Freij, Yazan},
title = {Naturalistic Metaphysics and Metaphysical Realism},
journal = {Revue de métaphysique et de morale},
year = {2025},
volume = {N° 125},
number = {2},
pages = {223--237},
doi = {10.3917/e.rmm.252.0223}
}
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