The wargaming signalling paradox: when military publication precedes political miscalculation
Defense and Security Studies · 18.02.2026 · 7 (1) · 89-105
DOI: 10.37868/dss.v7.id307 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Defense and Security Studies, online erschienen am 18.02.2026. Verfasst von Branko Ruzic. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines how publishing wargaming results or military planning timelines creates institutional commitment traps leading to strategic miscalculation. Analysing Russia's 2013 Gerasimov article and China's October 2025 15th Five-Year Plan, we identify three paradoxes: publication signals confidence while reflecting overconfidence; aims to deter but constrains flexibility; and demonstrates rigour while omitting critical behavioural factors. China's 2027 PLA centenary deadline is particularly concerning, as Xi Jinping's legitimacy becomes tied to published timelines despite acknowledged wargaming limitations - the same blind spots that contributed to Russia's Ukraine disaster. Contemporary Chinese simulation research exhibits identical problems while claiming 90% success probability.
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APA
Ruzic, B. (2026). The wargaming signalling paradox: when military publication precedes political miscalculation. Defense and Security Studies, 7(1), 89-105. https://doi.org/10.37868/dss.v7.id307
Vancouver
Ruzic B. The wargaming signalling paradox: when military publication precedes political miscalculation. Defense and Security Studies. 2026;7(1):89-105. doi:10.37868/dss.v7.id307
BibTeX
@article{Ruzic2026,
author = {Ruzic, Branko},
title = {The wargaming signalling paradox: when military publication precedes political miscalculation},
journal = {Defense and Security Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {7},
number = {1},
pages = {89--105},
doi = {10.37868/dss.v7.id307}
}
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