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Co-opetition in Financial Markets: Rational Benchmarks, Behavioral Implementability, and Coordination

Ondřej Černík

ACTA VŠFS · 30.06.2026 · 20 (1) · 69-91

DOI: 10.37355/acta-2026/1-04 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ACTA VŠFS, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Ondřej Černík.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Background

Financial market interactions often combine rivalry with interdependence: counterparties compete for margins, order flow, and informational advantage while relying on shared infrastructure, standards, clearing, and liquidity conventions. This creates a co-opetitive setting in which cooperation expands feasible outcomes and competition or convention selects a surplus division.

Aim

This paper formalizes co-opetition in financial markets as a two-layer bargaining structure in which cooperation expands the feasible bargaining set S (through infrastructure, standards, clearing, and admissible information-sharing), while competition or convention selects an agreement on the Pareto frontier P(S).

Methods

Two axiomatic bargaining solutions—the Nash solution (NS) and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (K–S)—are used as replicable rational benchmarks. Convex bargaining environments are compared with regime-type nonconvex environments, and the behavioral layer is expressed through an implementability criterion based on proportional asymmetry.

Results

In convex settings, NS and K–S provide alternative benchmark selections that differ in product efficiency and proportionality. In regime-nonconvex settings, Pareto efficiency alone does not determine the branch on which coordination should occur; the K–S ray-intersection is therefore interpreted as a publicly readable focal candidate for regime selection.

Conclusions

The paper does not claim an empirical proof of market-wide behavioral stability. Instead, it formulates behavioral implementability as a testable coordination condition: under regime nonconvexity and repeated or reputational interaction, observed agreements are expected to be closer to proportional K–S-like selections than to product-efficient extremes. A minimal observational, structural, and experimental verification strategy is outlined.

Zitieren

APA

Černík, O. (2026). Co-opetition in Financial Markets: Rational Benchmarks, Behavioral Implementability, and Coordination. ACTA VŠFS, 20(1), 69-91. https://doi.org/10.37355/acta-2026/1-04

Vancouver

Černík O. Co-opetition in Financial Markets: Rational Benchmarks, Behavioral Implementability, and Coordination. ACTA VŠFS. 2026;20(1):69-91. doi:10.37355/acta-2026/1-04

BibTeX
@article{ernk2026,
  author = {Černík, Ondřej},
  title = {Co-opetition in Financial Markets: Rational Benchmarks, Behavioral Implementability, and Coordination},
  journal = {ACTA VŠFS},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {20},
  number = {1},
  pages = {69--91},
  doi = {10.37355/acta-2026/1-04}
}
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