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Enforcement of International Court of Justice Judgments against Non-Compliant States: An Analysis of Existing Mechanisms under International Law

Kalumelita Innocent Tenywa

East African Journal of Law and Ethics · 20.08.2026 · 9 (3) · 266-282

DOI: 10.37284/eajle.9.3.5606 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift East African Journal of Law and Ethics, online erschienen am 20.08.2026. Verfasst von Kalumelita Innocent Tenywa. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This article critically examines the adequacy of existing legal and institutional mechanisms for enforcing judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against non-compliant states. Although Article 94(1) of the UN Charter establishes an unconditional obligation on UN member states to comply with ICJ judgments to which they are parties, the Charter's only compulsory enforcement route, recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2), is structurally compromised by the veto power reserved to the five permanent members. Employing a doctrinal, library-based methodology, the study analyses the legal framework governing enforcement under the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute; situates the enforcement problem within competing theoretical accounts of why states comply with international law, namely managerial, rational-choice/enforcement, legitimacy, and transnational legal process theories; and undertakes a comparative case analysis of five judgments spanning the Court's history: Corfu Channel, Nicaragua, the Genocide Convention case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), LaGrand, and Avena. The case analysis reveals a consistent pattern: compliance is generally high for judgments involving weaker or diplomatically unprotected states, but non-compliance clusters around cases implicating a permanent Security Council member or matters of acute domestic political sensitivity, and Article 94(2) has in practice been invoked successfully only once, in a manner immediately nullified by veto. The study further finds that, even outside the Security Council context, structural gaps the absence of any independent ICJ enforcement power, the lack of a standing compliance-monitoring body, and unresolved tensions between international obligations and domestic constitutional order, illustrated by LaGrand and Avena leave judgment creditors dependent on inherently uncertain informal mechanisms such as countermeasures, diplomatic pressure, and reputational cost. The article concludes that the enforcement deficit is not a peripheral defect but a structural feature of the Charter system, comprising at least two largely independent gaps: political capture of Article 94(2) by the veto, and a domestic implementation gap in federal and dualist legal systems. It advances a set of specific, actionable reforms directed at the UN General Assembly, the Security Council's permanent members, the UN Secretariat, national legislatures, and regional bodies such as the African Union, aimed at narrowing the gap between the binding character of ICJ judgments and their practical implementation.

Zitieren

APA

Tenywa, K. I. (2026). Enforcement of International Court of Justice Judgments against Non-Compliant States: An Analysis of Existing Mechanisms under International Law. East African Journal of Law and Ethics, 9(3), 266-282. https://doi.org/10.37284/eajle.9.3.5606

Vancouver

Tenywa KI. Enforcement of International Court of Justice Judgments against Non-Compliant States: An Analysis of Existing Mechanisms under International Law. East African Journal of Law and Ethics. 2026;9(3):266-282. doi:10.37284/eajle.9.3.5606

BibTeX
@article{Tenywa2026,
  author = {Tenywa, Kalumelita Innocent},
  title = {Enforcement of International Court of Justice Judgments against Non-Compliant States: An Analysis of Existing Mechanisms under International Law},
  journal = {East African Journal of Law and Ethics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {266--282},
  doi = {10.37284/eajle.9.3.5606}
}
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