Brazil-Russia-China-South Africa (BRCS) Paradox: Reconciling Normative Ambitions with Strategic Interests in the United Nations
The Thinker · 05.06.2026 · 106 (1) · 39-56
DOI: 10.36615/489vny95 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Thinker, online erschienen am 05.06.2026. Verfasst von Michael Tshinyalani Khorommbi. Die Arbeit nennt 126 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines the strategic tactics used by Brazil, South Africa, China, and Russia within the United Nations to promote their interests. An analysis of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Reform (2017–2019), United Nations Development System Reform (2018–2021), and International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judicial Selection (2023) uncovers four tactics of normative realpolitik: (i) procedural contestation, (ii) personnel placement, (iii) financial leverage, and (iv) coalition coordination. The argument challenges traditional international relations theories by demonstrating that states combine normative rhetoric with material and procedural strategies to promote institutional change in ways that exceed the explanatory scope of both realism and constructivism.
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APA
Khorommbi, M. T. (2026). Brazil-Russia-China-South Africa (BRCS) Paradox: Reconciling Normative Ambitions with Strategic Interests in the United Nations. The Thinker, 106(1), 39-56. https://doi.org/10.36615/489vny95
Vancouver
Khorommbi MT. Brazil-Russia-China-South Africa (BRCS) Paradox: Reconciling Normative Ambitions with Strategic Interests in the United Nations. The Thinker. 2026;106(1):39-56. doi:10.36615/489vny95
BibTeX
@article{Khorommbi2026,
author = {Khorommbi, Michael Tshinyalani},
title = {Brazil-Russia-China-South Africa (BRCS) Paradox: Reconciling Normative Ambitions with Strategic Interests in the United Nations},
journal = {The Thinker},
year = {2026},
volume = {106},
number = {1},
pages = {39--56},
doi = {10.36615/489vny95}
}
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