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Equity structure, incentive and constraint mechanisms, and corporate agency costs: An empirical study of listed companies in China’s textile industry

GUANG CHEN, C.S NAJIB DAFIA, SONG KANG

Industria Textila · 30.06.2026 · 424

DOI: 10.35530/it.077.03.202540 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Industria Textila, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von GUANG CHEN und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Equity structure forms the basis of governance, while incentive and constraint mechanisms represent its core. Together, they constitute a comprehensive corporate governance system. This study uses data from listed textile firms in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets (2013–2024) to construct incentive and constraint mechanism indices via principal component analysis. It explores how equity structure and these mechanisms affect agency costs and examines their interrelationships. Results show that equity structure, incentive mechanisms, and constraint mechanisms all significantly reduce agency costs, with incentives being the most effective. There are complementary effects between equity structure and incentive mechanisms, and substitutability between equity structure and constraint mechanisms, as well as between incentive and constraint mechanisms. Robustness checks confirm the reliability of these findings. Based on these results, we recommend deepening equity-based incentive reforms, improving diversified monitoring systems, and integrating governance mechanisms to maximise marginal governance efficiency. This study not only provides a systematic theoretical foundation and actionable practical solutions for optimising corporate governance in textile enterprises, but also offers a transferable analytical framework to inform governance practices in other sectors.

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APA

CHEN, G., DAFIA, C. N., & KANG, S. (2026). Equity structure, incentive and constraint mechanisms, and corporate agency costs: An empirical study of listed companies in China’s textile industry. Industria Textila, 424. https://doi.org/10.35530/it.077.03.202540

Vancouver

CHEN G, DAFIA CN, KANG S. Equity structure, incentive and constraint mechanisms, and corporate agency costs: An empirical study of listed companies in China’s textile industry. Industria Textila. 2026:424. doi:10.35530/it.077.03.202540

BibTeX
@article{CHEN2026,
  author = {CHEN, GUANG and DAFIA, C.S NAJIB and KANG, SONG},
  title = {Equity structure, incentive and constraint mechanisms, and corporate agency costs: An empirical study of listed companies in China’s textile industry},
  journal = {Industria Textila},
  year = {2026},
  pages = {424},
  doi = {10.35530/it.077.03.202540}
}
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