The software bill of materials as a defence capability: Supply-chain transparency, sovereignty, and alliance interoperability
Security and Defence Quarterly · 31.10.2026
DOI: 10.35467/sdq/236757 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Security and Defence Quarterly, online erschienen am 31.10.2026. Verfasst von Artur Chlebicki. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), a machine-readable inventory of the components inside a piece of software, and asks what doctrine, procurement, and alliance policy must change for defence organisations to convert software transparency into an exercised military capability rather than a filed compliance artefact. The method is a conceptual analysis of the theory-adaptation type. A review of SBOM standards, mandates, and the emerging scholarly literature is combined with a structured reading of six software supply-chain incidents, selected to span distinct attack vectors and used as analytical lenses rather than as an empirical sample; one is read as a disconfirming case to test the argument’s limits. The analysis identifies three defence functions that component-level transparency enables but the current acquisition leaves latent: (i) vulnerability triage at machine speed, (ii) supplychain attribution and provenance, and (iii) allied interoperability and digital sovereignty. It sets out five barriers (classification, vendor resistance, legacy platforms, false confidence, and the mismatch between acquisition and software rhythms) and proposes a four-level capability–maturity ladder (filed, queryable, integrated, and federated), positioned against the existing constructs, such as supply-chain levels for software artifacts, cybersecurity capability maturity model, cybersecurity maturity model certification, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s cybersecurity framework tiers. Defence procurement should require software composition data as a maintained, machine-readable capability requirement, enriched with exploitability context and exchanged between allies through format-neutral standards, so that reliance on foreign and open-source code becomes informed rather than be blind. The paper offers a North Atlantic Treaty Organization- and European Union-facing policy agenda and an agenda for measuring the operational value of supply-chain transparency.
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APA
Chlebicki, A. (2026). The software bill of materials as a defence capability: Supply-chain transparency, sovereignty, and alliance interoperability. Security and Defence Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/236757
Vancouver
Chlebicki A. The software bill of materials as a defence capability: Supply-chain transparency, sovereignty, and alliance interoperability. Security and Defence Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.35467/sdq/236757
BibTeX
@article{Chlebicki2026,
author = {Chlebicki, Artur},
title = {The software bill of materials as a defence capability: Supply-chain transparency, sovereignty, and alliance interoperability},
journal = {Security and Defence Quarterly},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.35467/sdq/236757}
}
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