Russian-Linked Sabotage in Poland: Attribution, Legal Resilience, and Public–Private Infrastructure Security
Security and Defence Quarterly · 17.07.2026
DOI: 10.35467/sdq/224401 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Security and Defence Quarterly, online erschienen am 17.07.2026. Verfasst von Michael S. Wisniewski. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines how recent Russian-linked sabotage and disruption in Poland became governance problems under conditions of attribution uncertainty, contested legal classification, and public–private infrastructure exposure. It asks how Polish authorities publicly interpreted, legally framed, and institutionally managed these incidents, and what they revealed about public–private resilience. The study uses qualitative content analysis within a focused comparative case-study design. It examines four Polish cases: the Marywilska 44 shopping-centre fire, the explosive parcel plot, the Warsaw–Lublin railway sabotage case, and the September 2025 drone-incursion and airport-disruption cluster. Open-source official statements, prosecutorial releases, legal materials, parliamentary sources, and public reporting were coded across three analytical dimensions: attribution, legal and institutional response, and public– private resilience. The cases show a shift from isolated-incident framing towards a broader campaign logic in which sabotage and disruption are treated as cumulative, networked, and strategically meaningful. Attribution developed unevenly across cases, while criminal-law responses were supplemented by diplomatic signalling, international investigation, protective mobilisation, airspace defence, and allied coordination. The cases also show that commercially ordinary systems can become strategically exposed when they support logistics, mobility, public confidence, continuity, or deterrence. Russian-linked sabotage operations create a governance problem because attribution, legal classification, and operational adaptation often move at different speeds. Public–private resilience therefore requires clearer reporting channels, baseline protective expectations, continuity planning, information-sharing mechanisms, and more explicit allocation of risk and responsibility between public authorities and private operators.
Zitieren
APA
Wisniewski, M. S. (2026). Russian-Linked Sabotage in Poland: Attribution, Legal Resilience, and Public–Private Infrastructure Security. Security and Defence Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/224401
Vancouver
Wisniewski MS. Russian-Linked Sabotage in Poland: Attribution, Legal Resilience, and Public–Private Infrastructure Security. Security and Defence Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.35467/sdq/224401
BibTeX
@article{Wisniewski2026,
author = {Wisniewski, Michael S.},
title = {Russian-Linked Sabotage in Poland: Attribution, Legal Resilience, and Public–Private Infrastructure Security},
journal = {Security and Defence Quarterly},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.35467/sdq/224401}
}
EUVIMED