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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Lost at Sea: GPS Spoofing Threats to Maritime Shipping

Sandali Srivastava, Shaunak Srivastava, Nithya Vemuri

European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security · 15.06.2026 · 25 (1) · 761-767

DOI: 10.34190/eccws.25.1.4916 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von Sandali Srivastava und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

As global shipping increasingly depends on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), cybersecurity threats thattarget maritime navigation systems have rapidly become a growing concern. Maritime GPS spoofing has significantimplications for global trade and safety as false position data can lead to route deviations, collisions, or even cargo theft. Togain a better understanding of these risks, this research analyzes real-world datasets to determine how spoofed signals caninfluence vessel navigation accuracy under different signal to noise conditions. By analyzing real-world AIS and GNSS logs,the study identifies localized anomalies consistent with spoofing or interference. This research investigates GPS spoofingattacks on commercial vessels and assesses real-world vulnerabilities to propose and develop effective countermeasures.Using data collected from Automatic Identification System (AIS) and GNSS receiver logs, the study measures the impact ofspoofed signals on ship positioning accuracy and identifies potential weaknesses in onboard navigation procedures. Theproject also explores policy and training aspects by proposing updated cybersecurity protocols for ship crews andrecommending that maritime authorities integrate spoofing detection into standard navigation safety audits. Based on thisanalysis, the project proposes low cost detection and mitigation strategies, which includes anomaly detection indicators andonboard incident response frameworks. The findings aim to improve awareness of GPS spoofing risks, strengthen maritimecybersecurity policy, and provide training guidelines for ship operators to reduce the likelihood of navigation manipulation,hijacking, and information theft. Ultimately, this research aims to contribute to the broader understanding of howcyberattacks intersect with physical infrastructure in the maritime domain. It emphasizes that cybersecurity at sea is not onlya technical challenge but also an organizational and policy issue requiring coordinated international action. The outcomesare expected to strengthen industry resilience, improve situational awareness, and support the development ofcomprehensive maritime cybersecurity frameworks that safeguard both economic and human interests.

Zitieren

APA

Srivastava, S., Srivastava, S., & Vemuri, N. (2026). Lost at Sea: GPS Spoofing Threats to Maritime Shipping. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 25(1), 761-767. https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.25.1.4916

Vancouver

Srivastava S, Srivastava S, Vemuri N. Lost at Sea: GPS Spoofing Threats to Maritime Shipping. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security. 2026;25(1):761-767. doi:10.34190/eccws.25.1.4916

BibTeX
@article{Srivastava2026,
  author = {Srivastava, Sandali and Srivastava, Shaunak and Vemuri, Nithya},
  title = {Lost at Sea: GPS Spoofing Threats to Maritime Shipping},
  journal = {European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {25},
  number = {1},
  pages = {761--767},
  doi = {10.34190/eccws.25.1.4916}
}
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