Cybersecurity for Military Satellite Systems: Threats, Domains, and Engineering Countermeasures
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security · 15.06.2026 · 25 (1) · 230-238
DOI: 10.34190/eccws.25.1.4662 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von William Easttom. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Military operations increasingly depend on satellite-enabled services for beyond-line-of-sight command-and-control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile warning, and precision navigation and timing. As space becomes more contested, adversaries can achieve operationally significant effects by cyber-compromising the end-to-end satellite enterprise rather than physically destroying spacecraft. A prominent example is the 24 February 2022 KA-SAT incident, where an intrusion into terrestrial management infrastructure and downstream user terminals disrupted connectivity for tens of thousands of users across Ukraine and Europe (CyberPeace Institute, 2022; Viasat, 2022). This paper develops an engineering-oriented threat model for military satellite systems across the ground, link, space, and user segments, then translates that model into implementable security controls and mission assurance design patterns. Using a quantitative, model-based risk assessment (Monte Carlo simulation) and control-to-attack-surface mapping, the paper prioritizes high-leverage mitigations such as privileged access management for mission operations, authenticated command and telemetry protection using standards-based space data-link cryptography, and zero trust architectures adapted to intermittent, high-latency RF environments (CISA, 2024a; CCSDS, 2020). Finally, the paper synthesizes resilience engineering principles—redundancy, graceful degradation, rapid reconstitution, and cyber-informed autonomy—into a pragmatic roadmap that aligns security investments with operational tempo. The central finding is that satellite cybersecurity must be treated as mission assurance: an integrated set of architectural, procedural, and cryptographic controls that preserve capability under sustained cyber pressure and enable recovery within tactically relevant timelines.
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APA
Easttom, W. (2026). Cybersecurity for Military Satellite Systems: Threats, Domains, and Engineering Countermeasures. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, 25(1), 230-238. https://doi.org/10.34190/eccws.25.1.4662
Vancouver
Easttom W. Cybersecurity for Military Satellite Systems: Threats, Domains, and Engineering Countermeasures. European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security. 2026;25(1):230-238. doi:10.34190/eccws.25.1.4662
BibTeX
@article{Easttom2026,
author = {Easttom, William},
title = {Cybersecurity for Military Satellite Systems: Threats, Domains, and Engineering Countermeasures},
journal = {European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security},
year = {2026},
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {230--238},
doi = {10.34190/eccws.25.1.4662}
}
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