Micro-économie de la corruption
Revue française d'économie · 2006 · 20 (4) · 117-159
DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revue française d'économie, 2006. Verfasst von Nicolas Jacquemet. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Microeconomics of Corruption. Regarding economic analysis, corruption is best understood as a situation involving two contradictory contracts: a delegation contract, between a principal and an agent, and a corruption pact. This illegal agreement, concluded between this agent and a briber, is aimed at misusing the discretionary power delegated to the agent by the principal. Given this contractual definition of corruption, the survey provided here highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of each of the three bilateral relationships between those players.
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APA
Jacquemet, N. (2006). Micro-économie de la corruption. Revue française d'économie, 20(4), 117-159. https://doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586
Vancouver
Jacquemet N. Micro-économie de la corruption. Revue française d'économie. 2006;20(4):117-159. doi:10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586
BibTeX
@article{Jacquemet2006,
author = {Jacquemet, Nicolas},
title = {Micro-économie de la corruption},
journal = {Revue française d'économie},
year = {2006},
volume = {20},
number = {4},
pages = {117--159},
doi = {10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586}
}
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