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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns

Lin Chen, Ran Tao, Yang Zhou, Huijie Li, Yinhua Jiang

Systems · 13.11.2026 · 14 (11) · 1457

DOI: 10.3390/systems14111457 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Systems, online erschienen am 13.11.2026. Verfasst von Lin Chen und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single platform to examine how the choices made by AI investors regarding implementation and sales models affect supply chain operations in a scenario where artificial intelligence raises consumer privacy concerns. We consider three scenarios in two selling modes: no AI investment, manufacturer-led AI investment, and platform-led AI investment. Game models under different scenarios are established and solved. The results show that: (1) Consumer privacy disutility reduces AI investment in all four investment scenarios. Platform ancillary data revenue strengthens investment incentives under wholesale selling and platform-led agency selling but does not enter the manufacturer’s investment objective under manufacturer-led agency selling. (2) Within the wholesale mode, manufacturer-led investment generates higher firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare than platform-led investment. Under agency selling, the preferred investor depends on ancillary data revenue and the stakeholder considered. (3) Under the baseline profit-sharing contract, agency selling yields higher consumer surplus and social welfare without AI investment and with platform-led investment. With manufacturer-led investment, wholesale selling can yield higher welfare over a feasible low-cost interval whose existence depends on residual market potential. A revenue-sharing extension preserves the agency-mode welfare advantage under the selected payoff-matched commissions in both numerical settings, while commission sensitivity reveals regions of wholesale dominance. Further extensions examine AI operating costs, investment cost sharing, and AI-dependent price sensitivity. The results show how investment incentives, contractual payments, and privacy disutility jointly determine supply chain outcomes.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Chen, L., Tao, R., Zhou, Y., Li, H., & Jiang, Y. (2026). Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns. Systems, 14(11), 1457. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14111457

Vancouver

Chen L, Tao R, Zhou Y, Li H, Jiang Y. Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns. Systems. 2026;14(11):1457. doi:10.3390/systems14111457

BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
  author = {Chen, Lin and Tao, Ran and Zhou, Yang and Li, Huijie and Jiang, Yinhua},
  title = {Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns},
  journal = {Systems},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1457},
  doi = {10.3390/systems14111457}
}
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