A Four-Party Evolutionary Game of Payment-Risk Governance Under Regulatory Credibility
Systems · 08.11.2026 · 14 (11) · 1434
DOI: 10.3390/systems14111434 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Systems, online erschienen am 08.11.2026. Verfasst von Yang Wang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Blocked bank withdrawals generate concentrated funding requests and online discussion, while discussion activity and funding resolution can follow different timelines. This study develops a four-party evolutionary game of regulators, financial institutions, information disseminators, and claimants. Original posts, publicly visible comments, and public resolution documents from the Henan village bank event provide the practical setting for examining strategic evolution under funding and information conditions. Regulatory credibility promotes orderly waiting when payment capacity, executable advance-payment arrangements, and reliable information provide support. When proactive action benefits all parties and unresolved demands dissipate faster than financial and information pressure accumulates, the system returns to coordinated governance after small perturbations. This study integrates funding arrangements, information governance, and multi-actor strategic interaction into a unified framework to examine payment-risk governance following blocked withdrawals.
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APA
Wang, Y., Wang, S., & Dong, Z. (2026). A Four-Party Evolutionary Game of Payment-Risk Governance Under Regulatory Credibility. Systems, 14(11), 1434. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14111434
Vancouver
Wang Y, Wang S, Dong Z. A Four-Party Evolutionary Game of Payment-Risk Governance Under Regulatory Credibility. Systems. 2026;14(11):1434. doi:10.3390/systems14111434
BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
author = {Wang, Yang and Wang, Saihong and Dong, Zuoji},
title = {A Four-Party Evolutionary Game of Payment-Risk Governance Under Regulatory Credibility},
journal = {Systems},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {11},
pages = {1434},
doi = {10.3390/systems14111434}
}
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