Benefit Allocation and Risk-Sharing Mechanisms in Supply Chain Systems Under Industrial Innovation Alliances: A Case Study of CRRC Tangshan
Systems · 07.11.2026 · 14 (11) · 1429
DOI: 10.3390/systems14111429 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Systems, online erschienen am 07.11.2026. Verfasst von Ying Li und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study examines supplier selection, alliance formation, benefit allocation, and risk sharing under a reverse vision-driven supply chain framework, using CRRC Tangshan’s lightweight rail vehicle project as the case setting. A bilateral innovation-investment model is developed to compare independent investment under non-alliance conditions with coordinated surplus-maximizing investment under an assumed binding joint R&D arrangement. Ridge regression is trained using 32 evaluation indicators from 87 historical suppliers to predict the innovation efficiency of 18 candidate suppliers, from which the 14 highest-ranked suppliers are selected for subsequent alliance analysis. Supplier-specific innovation-resource costs and coordination costs are incorporated into the bilateral model to determine critical synergy thresholds for alliance formation and feasible benefit-allocation intervals under individual rationality. For risk sharing, the Delphi method is used to determine indicator weights, fuzzy comprehensive evaluation assesses participants’ risk-bearing suitability, and an adjusted Shapley-value approach determines risk-sharing responsibilities based on marginal contributions to collective risk-bearing capability and individual suitability. The results show that critical synergy thresholds vary across the 14 manufacturer–supplier dyads, ranging from 0.004 to 0.032, reflecting heterogeneous innovation efficiency and cost conditions. Under the baseline scenario in which synergy is set at 1.5 times each critical threshold, feasible benefit-allocation intervals differ across suppliers, primarily reflecting their non-alliance payoffs. The risk-sharing results assign 64.718% of the alliance risk responsibility to the focal manufacturer and 35.282% to the 14 suppliers collectively, while benefit-allocation positions and risk-sharing responsibilities exhibit only partial correspondence. Sensitivity analysis indicates that higher fixed coordination costs may make alliance formation economically infeasible at the assumed synergy levels, whereas the relative ordering of supplier benefit requirements remains stable across the examined economically feasible scenarios. The study’s research contribution lies in linking reverse vision-driven supplier identification with the economic conditions for alliance formation and distinguishing benefit-allocation requirements from risk-sharing responsibilities. These findings provide a case-based reference for assessing alliance formation, benefit-allocation feasibility, and risk-sharing arrangements under heterogeneous participant conditions.
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APA
Li, Y., Wei, Y., Jin, Y., Wu, G., Jiang, C., & Xu, F. (2026). Benefit Allocation and Risk-Sharing Mechanisms in Supply Chain Systems Under Industrial Innovation Alliances: A Case Study of CRRC Tangshan. Systems, 14(11), 1429. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14111429
Vancouver
Li Y, Wei Y, Jin Y, Wu G, Jiang C, Xu F. Benefit Allocation and Risk-Sharing Mechanisms in Supply Chain Systems Under Industrial Innovation Alliances: A Case Study of CRRC Tangshan. Systems. 2026;14(11):1429. doi:10.3390/systems14111429
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Ying and Wei, Youyi and Jin, Yantong and Wu, Gang and Jiang, Chaozhe and Xu, Fang},
title = {Benefit Allocation and Risk-Sharing Mechanisms in Supply Chain Systems Under Industrial Innovation Alliances: A Case Study of CRRC Tangshan},
journal = {Systems},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {11},
pages = {1429},
doi = {10.3390/systems14111429}
}
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