Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation
Systems · 15.07.2025 · 13 (7) · 590
DOI: 10.3390/systems13070590 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Systems, online erschienen am 15.07.2025. Verfasst von Liping Wang und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Social Science Fund of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In the low-carbon era, there is a serious challenge of climate change, which urgently needs to promote low-carbon consumption behavior in order to build sustainable low-carbon consumption patterns. The establishment of this model not only requires in-depth theoretical research as support, but also requires tripartite cooperation between the government, enterprises and the public to jointly promote the popularization and practice of the low-carbon consumption concept. Therefore, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis, this study deeply discusses the mechanism of government policy on the strategy choice of logistics enterprises. The stability strategy and satisfying conditions are deeply analyzed by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the logistics industry, government, and consumers. With the help of MATLAB R2023b simulation analysis, the following key conclusions are drawn: (1) The strategic choice of logistics enterprises is affected by various government policies, including research and development intensity, construction intensity, and punishment intensity. These government policies and measures guide logistics enterprises toward low-carbon development. (2) The government’s research, development, and punishment intensity are vital in determining whether logistics enterprises adopt low-carbon strategies. R&D efforts incentivize logistics companies to adopt low-carbon technologies by driving technological innovation and reducing costs. The penalties include economic sanctions to restrain companies that do not comply with low-carbon standards. In contrast, construction intensity mainly affects the consumption behavior of consumers and then indirectly affects the strategic choice of logistics enterprises through market demand. (3) Although the government’s active supervision is a necessary guarantee for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategies, more is needed. This means that in addition to the government’s policy support, it also needs the active efforts of the logistics enterprises themselves and the improvement of the market mechanism to promote the low-carbon development of the logistics industry jointly. This study quantifies the impact of different factors on the system’s evolution, providing a precise decision-making basis for policymakers and helping promote the logistics industry’s and consumers’ low-carbon transition. It also provides theoretical support for the logistics industry’s low-carbon development and green low-carbon consumption and essential guidance for sustainable development.
Förderung
- National Social Science Fund of China
Zitieren
APA
Wang, L., Ye, Z., Lei, T., Liu, K., & Li, C. (2025). Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation. Systems, 13(7), 590. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13070590
Vancouver
Wang L, Ye Z, Lei T, Liu K, Li C. Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation. Systems. 2025;13(7):590. doi:10.3390/systems13070590
BibTeX
@article{Wang2025,
author = {Wang, Liping and Ye, Zhonghao and Lei, Tongtong and Liu, Kaiyue and Li, Chuang},
title = {Green and Low-Carbon Strategy of Logistics Enterprises Under “Dual Carbon”: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Simulation},
journal = {Systems},
year = {2025},
volume = {13},
number = {7},
pages = {590},
doi = {10.3390/systems13070590}
}
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