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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Resilience for Cyber-Physical System Stability Under Cryptographic Computation Delays and Weaponized Workloads Evaluated on a Canonical Plant

Mordecai Opoku Ohemeng, Frederick T. Sheldon, Jia Song

Symmetry · 15.11.2026 · 18 (11) · 1913

DOI: 10.3390/sym18111913 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Symmetry, online erschienen am 15.11.2026. Verfasst von Mordecai Opoku Ohemeng und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cyber-physical systems such as UAV swarms increasingly face cross-layer attacks in which adversaries weaponize cryptographic workloads to induce scheduling delays, CPU starvation, and physical instability. This paper develops a framework that co-designs input-to-state stability (ISS) with the symmetric and asymmetric processing overheads of the cryptographic stack. Cryptographic verification delays and adversarial computational loads are modeled as endogenous, state-dependent terms within a switched delay system, enabling Lyapunov–Krasovskii stability guarantees under resource-constrained operation. Exploiting the cost asymmetry between cryptographic primitives, the framework transitions between lightweight symmetric verification during nominal operation and stronger asymmetric verification under detected anomalies, with the escalation certified by the same functional that establishes stability. To enforce the certified delay bound by load shedding, the framework employs admission control, dropping excess packets at the network interface when the incoming workload exceeds CPU capacity. The empirical evaluation uses 33 measured attack captures from a publicly available UAV network intrusion detection dataset, spanning 13 attack classes with durations from 18.4 s to 3121.7 s. Converting measured packet rates into CPU load shows that eight of the 13 classes exceed unity load, with distributed denial of service (DDoS) reaching approximately 20× saturation and DoS reaching approximately 10×. Under a common attack schedule generated from this distribution, an unprotected verification path diverges while the proposed mechanism remains bounded by capping the queue at the certificate limit; a bandwidth sweep on the canonical plant identifies approximately 8 rad/s as the threshold above which the unprotected system destabilizes.

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APA

Ohemeng, M. O., Sheldon, F. T., & Song, J. (2026). Resilience for Cyber-Physical System Stability Under Cryptographic Computation Delays and Weaponized Workloads Evaluated on a Canonical Plant. Symmetry, 18(11), 1913. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym18111913

Vancouver

Ohemeng MO, Sheldon FT, Song J. Resilience for Cyber-Physical System Stability Under Cryptographic Computation Delays and Weaponized Workloads Evaluated on a Canonical Plant. Symmetry. 2026;18(11):1913. doi:10.3390/sym18111913

BibTeX
@article{Ohemeng2026,
  author = {Ohemeng, Mordecai Opoku and Sheldon, Frederick T. and Song, Jia},
  title = {Resilience for Cyber-Physical System Stability Under Cryptographic Computation Delays and Weaponized Workloads Evaluated on a Canonical Plant},
  journal = {Symmetry},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1913},
  doi = {10.3390/sym18111913}
}
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