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StudienprotokollOpen Access · CC BY 4.0

Provably Secure and Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Smart Microgrids

Qi Xie, Yong Luo

Symmetry · 13.05.2026 · 18 (5) · 838

DOI: 10.3390/sym18050838 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Symmetry, online erschienen am 13.05.2026. Verfasst von Qi Xie und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Because smart microgrids can flexibly integrate distributed energy resources and support grid-connected and islanded operation modes, they enhance power supply reliability and promote the efficient utilization of renewable energy. However, the open communication environment and physically exposed infrastructure introduce critical security challenges, including risks of physical hijacking and data leakage. Many existing authentication protocols either fail to address these threats or rely on heavyweight cryptographic operations such as bilinear pairings and modular exponentiation, resulting in high computational and communicational overhead. To address these issues, a lightweight authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for smart microgrids is proposed. The protocol symmetrically integrates Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) into the smart meter (SM) and smart microgrid control center (SMC) to protect stored secret information against capture attacks. Meanwhile, the SM and SMC register with the data center (DC) in a symmetric manner. During the AKA phase, the DC only assists in authenticating the identities of the SM and SMC online in a symmetric way, without participating in session key computation, thereby reducing the trust burden and computational load on the smart meters and control center. Formal security proof and informal security analysis demonstrate that the proposed protocol can resist known attacks such as physical hijacking and data leakage. Compared with existing smart microgrid authentication protocols, the proposed protocol has performance advantages and the lowest computational cost, confirming its suitability for resource-constrained microgrid environments.

Förderung

  • Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Xie, Q., & Luo, Y. (2026). Provably Secure and Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Smart Microgrids. Symmetry, 18(5), 838. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym18050838

Vancouver

Xie Q, Luo Y. Provably Secure and Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Smart Microgrids. Symmetry. 2026;18(5):838. doi:10.3390/sym18050838

BibTeX
@article{Xie2026,
  author = {Xie, Qi and Luo, Yong},
  title = {Provably Secure and Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Smart Microgrids},
  journal = {Symmetry},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {5},
  pages = {838},
  doi = {10.3390/sym18050838}
}
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