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Research on the Differential Game of Collaborative Carbon Emission Reduction in the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Under a Mixed Policy

Yan Chen, Jiemei Pang, Yaqian Wu

Sustainability · 13.11.2026 · 18 (22) · 11609

DOI: 10.3390/su182211609 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sustainability, online erschienen am 13.11.2026. Verfasst von Yan Chen und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Social Science Foundation, Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation, Shandong Provincial Postgraduate Quality Course Project.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The transportation sector is a major carbon emitter, with new energy vehicle (NEV) promotion via the credit trading policy being a key mitigation strategy. However, the credit trading policy overlooks huge carbon emissions from upstream component manufacturing such as batteries. The “manufacturer–retailer” two-echelon supply chain (SC) analysis framework constructed by most current studies fails to capture the significant potential for carbon emission reduction (CER) in the upstream phase of the NEV SC. This study examines a mixed “credit trading + carbon trading” policy, which compensates for the credit-only perspective’s limitations, in a two-echelon NEV supply chain (a supplier and a manufacturer). Using a differential game approach, this study compares the standalone credit trading policy and the mixed policy, under decentralized and centralized decision-making, to assess effects on supply chain members’ CER efforts, low-carbon marketing efforts, product CER level, corporate’s low-carbon reputation, individual profits, and total SC profit, and to design an improved bilateral cost-sharing contract. Results show that the mixed policy better integrates suppliers into the CER system, incentivizes greater voluntary CERs from upstream and downstream members, and maintains positive low-carbon marketing efforts. Under the mixed policy, centralized decision-making outperforms decentralized decision-making in raising the product CER level and strengthening corporate’s low-carbon reputation. An improved bilateral cost-sharing contract ensures a fair allocation of decarbonization-related costs and benefits among supply chain members and achieves Pareto improvement for the SC. These findings provide valuable guidance for policymakers to design hybrid decarbonization policies and for NEV supply chain members to construct supply chain coordination mechanisms for collaborative CER.

Förderung

  • National Social Science Foundation
  • Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation
  • Shandong Provincial Postgraduate Quality Course Project

Zitieren

APA

Chen, Y., Pang, J., & Wu, Y. (2026). Research on the Differential Game of Collaborative Carbon Emission Reduction in the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Under a Mixed Policy. Sustainability, 18(22), 11609. https://doi.org/10.3390/su182211609

Vancouver

Chen Y, Pang J, Wu Y. Research on the Differential Game of Collaborative Carbon Emission Reduction in the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Under a Mixed Policy. Sustainability. 2026;18(22):11609. doi:10.3390/su182211609

BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
  author = {Chen, Yan and Pang, Jiemei and Wu, Yaqian},
  title = {Research on the Differential Game of Collaborative Carbon Emission Reduction in the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Under a Mixed Policy},
  journal = {Sustainability},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {22},
  pages = {11609},
  doi = {10.3390/su182211609}
}
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