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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Integrating Incentive Contracts and External Financing in Capital-Constrained Green Supply Chains

Kai Chen, Hongzhuan Chen, Jing Wu, Xiang Cai

Sustainability · 17.08.2026 · 18 (16) · 8414

DOI: 10.3390/su18168414 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sustainability, online erschienen am 17.08.2026. Verfasst von Kai Chen und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Upstream small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in emerging economies often face severe credit constraints. These constraints hinder green transformation by limiting green R&D investment and production capacity. To address this, we develop a Stackelberg-based governance strategy selection framework. We first analyze cost-sharing (CS) and equity-sharing (ES) contracts and then extend them by incorporating external financing, where the retailer’s contractual commitment serves as an operational guarantee. This integration leads to two incentive-financing bundles, namely CS-F and ES-F. Three main findings emerge. First, capital constraints fundamentally shape the feasibility of green supply chain governance by creating a trade-off between green R&D and physical production. Specifically, the CS contract is feasible only within an intermediate capital range, whereas the ES contract is infeasible. Second, the incentive-financing bundles relax capital constraints and expand the feasible governance region. Although all feasible governance strategies promote green R&D investment, the ES-F bundle remains more sensitive to parameter variations. Third, the optimal governance strategy depends primarily on firms’ capital conditions, shifting across CS, CS-F, and ES-F. Notably, a distributive-efficiency paradox emerges: even when the ES-F bundle yields greater total surplus, a higher sharing ratio violates the retailer’s individual rationality and prevents its adoption. We introduce an asymmetric Nash bargaining mechanism to address this paradox. The mechanism determines transfer payments endogenously and restores the efficient governance outcome. Overall, our findings help supply chain managers select appropriate governance strategies based on observable firm-level capital conditions.

Förderung

  • Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Chen, K., Chen, H., Wu, J., & Cai, X. (2026). Integrating Incentive Contracts and External Financing in Capital-Constrained Green Supply Chains. Sustainability, 18(16), 8414. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18168414

Vancouver

Chen K, Chen H, Wu J, Cai X. Integrating Incentive Contracts and External Financing in Capital-Constrained Green Supply Chains. Sustainability. 2026;18(16):8414. doi:10.3390/su18168414

BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
  author = {Chen, Kai and Chen, Hongzhuan and Wu, Jing and Cai, Xiang},
  title = {Integrating Incentive Contracts and External Financing in Capital-Constrained Green Supply Chains},
  journal = {Sustainability},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {16},
  pages = {8414},
  doi = {10.3390/su18168414}
}
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