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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Behavioral Coordination in Community Pluvial Flood Resilience: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Linli Tao, Sheng Zhang, Chao Liu, Mehtab Hussain Talpur

Sustainability · 06.08.2026 · 18 (15) · 8001

DOI: 10.3390/su18158001 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sustainability, online erschienen am 06.08.2026. Verfasst von Linli Tao und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Education Department of Hunan Province.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Urban pluvial flood resilience relies not only on engineering defenses but also on effective behavioral coordination among local governments, property management companies (PMCs), and residents. Yet even when risks are recognized, preparedness often fails because costs are immediate and certain, whereas benefits are delayed and probabilistic. This study addresses this dilemma by integrating prospect theory into a tripartite evolutionary game model. We position PMCs as pivotal intermediaries whose maintenance decisions critically influence whether physical infrastructure can be translated into operational resilience. Simulation results show that actors initially remain inactive under uncertainty. Stable collaboration emerges only when government regulation, PMC maintenance, and resident participation reinforce one another. Equal-magnitude policy comparisons reveal an asymmetric policy effect: sufficiently strong penalties induce tripartite cooperation, whereas equivalent subsidies primarily improve PMC maintenance without sustaining resident engagement. Excessive post-disaster relief further weakens ex ante incentives by creating moral hazard. These findings advance community flood governance toward psychologically informed, actor-specific policy mixes, emphasizing clear responsibility allocation, targeted incentives, and conditional relief, to strengthen community-level climate adaptation and adaptive resilience under uncertainty.

Förderung

  • Education Department of Hunan Province

Zitieren

APA

Tao, L., Zhang, S., Liu, C., & Talpur, M. H. (2026). Behavioral Coordination in Community Pluvial Flood Resilience: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis. Sustainability, 18(15), 8001. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18158001

Vancouver

Tao L, Zhang S, Liu C, Talpur MH. Behavioral Coordination in Community Pluvial Flood Resilience: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis. Sustainability. 2026;18(15):8001. doi:10.3390/su18158001

BibTeX
@article{Tao2026,
  author = {Tao, Linli and Zhang, Sheng and Liu, Chao and Talpur, Mehtab Hussain},
  title = {Behavioral Coordination in Community Pluvial Flood Resilience: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis},
  journal = {Sustainability},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {15},
  pages = {8001},
  doi = {10.3390/su18158001}
}
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