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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Parcel Lockers in Last-Mile Delivery: A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Urban Logistics from the Platform-Economy Perspective

Xiaohuan Wang, Kexin Su, Luojie Liu, Zhi-Ping Fan, Chaoyue Song

Sustainability · 24.07.2026 · 18 (15) · 7562

DOI: 10.3390/su18157562 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sustainability, online erschienen am 24.07.2026. Verfasst von Xiaohuan Wang und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

With the promotion of public service infrastructure and the construction of intelligent communities, parcel lockers have become an effective alternative for last-mile delivery. But express companies still face strategic questions about whether to cooperate with third-party locker platforms, use advertising-supported platforms, or build their own platforms. This study examines how express companies and parcel locker operators should design pricing, advertising, and ownership strategies from a platform-economy perspective. Employing Stackelberg game models, four operational modes are analyzed: home delivery only, cooperation with a third-party platform, cooperation with an advertising-supported platform, and operating a self-built platform. We explore parcel locker strategies by considering customer-to-advertiser network externality and their impact on the pricing, advertising, and ownership decisions of parcel locker platforms. Comparative analyses show that introducing platform delivery increases express companies’ profitability and expands total delivery demand, while advertising can further reduce platform delivery fees and increase the profits of both the express company and the parcel locker platform. However, the self-built decision depends mainly on self-building and operating cost, customers’ perceived convenience, waiting cost, service substitutability, customer-to-advertiser network externality, service area, and locker capacity sufficiency. This study explains the economic and operational mechanisms through which parcel locker platforms may support more efficient and potentially more sustainable last-mile urban logistics.

Förderung

  • Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China

Zitieren

APA

Wang, X., Su, K., Liu, L., Fan, Z., & Song, C. (2026). Parcel Lockers in Last-Mile Delivery: A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Urban Logistics from the Platform-Economy Perspective. Sustainability, 18(15), 7562. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18157562

Vancouver

Wang X, Su K, Liu L, Fan Z, Song C. Parcel Lockers in Last-Mile Delivery: A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Urban Logistics from the Platform-Economy Perspective. Sustainability. 2026;18(15):7562. doi:10.3390/su18157562

BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
  author = {Wang, Xiaohuan and Su, Kexin and Liu, Luojie and Fan, Zhi-Ping and Song, Chaoyue},
  title = {Parcel Lockers in Last-Mile Delivery: A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Urban Logistics from the Platform-Economy Perspective},
  journal = {Sustainability},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {15},
  pages = {7562},
  doi = {10.3390/su18157562}
}
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