Accomplices in Power: Elite Binding and the Durability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Social Sciences · 30.10.2026 · 15 (11) · 755
DOI: 10.3390/socsci15110755 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Sciences, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von Muk Yan Wong. Die Arbeit nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Why do elite coalitions in some electoral authoritarian regimes hold together when shrinking rents, contested legitimacy, and credible exit options should produce defection? The post-Soviet “blackmail state” literature shows that rulers cultivate complicity as a leash, but this explains why compromised elites fear defection, not why they cease to want it. This article identifies a mechanism—accomplice-making—through which dictators convert pragmatic collaborators into self-binding partisans by conditioning power on publicly attributable transgression. It unfolds in three stages: transgression as entry fee, complicity as allegiance token and sunk cost, and dissonance generating ideological internalisation. Paired post-Soviet comparisons illustrate the argument, with implications for authoritarian resilience and Western coalition-fracture strategies.
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APA
Wong, M. Y. (2026). Accomplices in Power: Elite Binding and the Durability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes. Social Sciences, 15(11), 755. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci15110755
Vancouver
Wong MY. Accomplices in Power: Elite Binding and the Durability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes. Social Sciences. 2026;15(11):755. doi:10.3390/socsci15110755
BibTeX
@article{Wong2026,
author = {Wong, Muk Yan},
title = {Accomplices in Power: Elite Binding and the Durability of Electoral Authoritarian Regimes},
journal = {Social Sciences},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {11},
pages = {755},
doi = {10.3390/socsci15110755}
}
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