Electoral Cycles and Minimum Wages in Argentina
Social Sciences · 03.04.2026 · 15 (4) · 236
DOI: 10.3390/socsci15040236 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Sciences, online erschienen am 03.04.2026. Verfasst von Miguel A. Bastos-Boubeta und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We document the evolution of minimum salaries in Argentina during electoral cycles. We argue that incumbent politicians tend to significantly increase the growth rates of minimum salaries a few days before primary elections, and they generally keep them high for a long period until general elections conclude. This is due to the fact that minimum wages are known to be best justified by their social contributions rather than their economic effects. Our findings provide evidence of the strategic tools that are used by incumbent politicians to increase their chances of being re-elected. Our results highlight the importance that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field during electoral campaigns, and there are mechanisms in place that guarantee that incumbents do not use strategic tools (such as increases in minimum salaries) for their own benefit just before elections.
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APA
Bastos-Boubeta, M. A., & Loureiro-Lodeiro, A. M. (2026). Electoral Cycles and Minimum Wages in Argentina. Social Sciences, 15(4), 236. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci15040236
Vancouver
Bastos-Boubeta MA, Loureiro-Lodeiro AM. Electoral Cycles and Minimum Wages in Argentina. Social Sciences. 2026;15(4):236. doi:10.3390/socsci15040236
BibTeX
@article{BastosBoubeta2026,
author = {Bastos-Boubeta, Miguel A. and Loureiro-Lodeiro, Angel M.},
title = {Electoral Cycles and Minimum Wages in Argentina},
journal = {Social Sciences},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {4},
pages = {236},
doi = {10.3390/socsci15040236}
}
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