EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Distributed H−/H∞ Attack Detection for Intelligent Connected Vehicle Platoons: A Coupling-Aware Observer Approach

Li Niu, Shenghui Guo

Sensors · 28.10.2026 · 26 (21) · 6820

DOI: 10.3390/s26216820 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 28.10.2026. Verfasst von Li Niu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Computer Engineering, Suzhou Polytechnic University, Suzhou 215104, China. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Jiangsu Province University Philosophy and Social Sciences Research Project, Suzhou Polytechnic University Teaching Reform Project, Institute of AI Model Industry Research.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cooperative driving stacks for intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) depend on a continuous exchange of position and velocity data over vehicle-to-vehicle links. That dependence is also their weakness: an adversary who tampers with exchanged measurements can push a platoon toward unsafe spacing before any physical symptom appears. This paper develops a distributed attack-detection scheme for ICV platoons that is sensitive to such data manipulations yet remains robust to road disturbances. Each vehicle runs a local observer whose correction term mixes its own sensor residual with the state estimates broadcast by its immediate neighbours, so the wind-resistance coupling between vehicles is exploited rather than ignored. Using a modal decomposition of the platoon dynamics over the communication graph, sufficient conditions for an H∞ disturbance-attenuation level and an H− attack-sensitivity level are derived as a common set of linear matrix inequalities; a bisection algorithm then computes a single observer gain meeting both. Detection rests on a windowed residual-energy test with per-vehicle thresholds calibrated as empirical quantiles over an ensemble of attack-free runs. On a five-vehicle platoon, the detector identifies transient FDI and replay attacks with detection rates of 100% and 100% at a validated false-alarm rate of 0.46%, reaches a mean detection rate of 97.7% over the transient-attack windows of a 300-run Monte Carlo study, and exposes a denial-of-service attack on a single link through the open-loop prediction mismatch it induces (48.8% of the attacked window); stealthy zero-dynamics attacks, which by construction excite the least observable directions of the plant, are flagged on 0.0% of attacked samples in the documented low-energy configuration, while an amplitude–rate–location sweep shows detection climbing to 98% once the attack energy grows, confirming attack energy rather than placement as the operative limit. Relative to an H∞-only observer, it trades empirical detection aggressiveness for a structural guarantee: a certified worst-case attack-sensitivity floor that the baseline does not provide and that survives coupling levels at which uncertified designs lose feasibility. A closing experiment embeds the detector in a cooperative adaptive cruise control loop: mean peak spacing error during a sensor attack averages 7.93 m, against 10.79 m without detection, while forced false-alarm rates of 5–15% latch the conservative control schedule and degrade spacing beyond the no-detection case; a calibrated low false-alarm rate is a safety property, not a convenience.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

H−/H∞ indexattack detectioncyber-physical securitydistributed observerintelligent connected vehicleslinear matrix inequalityplatoon

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Computer Engineering, Suzhou Polytechnic University, Suzhou 215104, China.
  • School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, China.

Förderung

  • Jiangsu Province University Philosophy and Social Sciences Research Project
  • Suzhou Polytechnic University Teaching Reform Project
  • Institute of AI Model Industry Research

Zitieren

APA

Niu, L., & Guo, S. (2026). Distributed H−/H∞ Attack Detection for Intelligent Connected Vehicle Platoons: A Coupling-Aware Observer Approach. Sensors, 26(21), 6820. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26216820

Vancouver

Niu L, Guo S. Distributed H−/H∞ Attack Detection for Intelligent Connected Vehicle Platoons: A Coupling-Aware Observer Approach. Sensors. 2026;26(21):6820. doi:10.3390/s26216820

BibTeX
@article{Niu2026,
  author = {Niu, Li and Guo, Shenghui},
  title = {Distributed H−/H∞ Attack Detection for Intelligent Connected Vehicle Platoons: A Coupling-Aware Observer Approach},
  journal = {Sensors},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {21},
  pages = {6820},
  doi = {10.3390/s26216820}
}
Kostenlos starten →