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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Design of AFDM Waveform Encryption for LEO Satellite Networks

Muzi Yuan iD, Honglei Lin, Chunjiang Ma iD, Pengcheng Ma, Meiting Yu, Xiaomei Tang

Sensors · 20.08.2026 · 26 (16) · 5282

DOI: 10.3390/s26165282 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 20.08.2026. Verfasst von Muzi Yuan und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China. Die Arbeit nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite downlinks broadcast over wide ground footprints, exposing Earth-observation and remote-sensing sensor data to passive eavesdropping. Affine frequency division multiplexing (AFDM) is a candidate waveform for the doubly dispersive LEO channel and a natural integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) waveform whose delay–Doppler structure supports target parameter estimation; yet existing secure-AFDM schemes act only in the discrete affine Fourier transform (DAFT) parameter domain, leaving the transmitted waveform structurally recognizable. To address this gap, this paper applies time-domain waveform obfuscation to AFDM as physical layer encryption. Using a secret key, the transmitter permutes the inverse-DAFT samples and applies a phase rotation before chirp-periodic-prefix generation; the mask is unitary, so the peak-to-average power ratio is preserved exactly, and the key-holding receiver retains AFDM’s full delay–Doppler sensing capability, while a no-key receiver obtains a dense composite response that destroys target localization (sensing concentration drops from 0 dB to −16.6 dB). Secret pilot phases enable channel estimation at the legitimate receiver while blocking a naive composite-channel attack. Simulations at N=64 and 128 show that a wrong-key eavesdropper achieves uncoded BER within 0.01 of 0.5 across 0–20 dB and that blind Viterbi–Viterbi phase recovery is no more effective under QPSK (BER 0.46–0.48), while the legitimate SNR penalty stays below 0.5 dB. The mask also suppresses AFDM’s internal structure to the AWGN level under AFDM-aware processing. Time-domain obfuscation offers a complementary physical-layer security layer for confidential LEO remote-sensing data downlink and ISAC waveforms.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

affine frequency division multiplexing (AFDM)doubly dispersive channelintegrated sensing and communication (ISAC)low Earth orbit (LEO) satellitephysical layer encryptionremote sensingtime-domain obfuscationwaveform encryption

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China.
  • National Key Laboratory for Positioning, Navigation and Timing Technology, Changsha 410073, China.
  • School of Electronic Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China.

ORCID-Profile: Muzi Yuan, Chunjiang Ma

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Yuan, M., Lin, H., Ma, C., Ma, P., Yu, M., & Tang, X. (2026). Design of AFDM Waveform Encryption for LEO Satellite Networks. Sensors, 26(16), 5282. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26165282

Vancouver

Yuan M, Lin H, Ma C, Ma P, Yu M, Tang X. Design of AFDM Waveform Encryption for LEO Satellite Networks. Sensors. 2026;26(16):5282. doi:10.3390/s26165282

BibTeX
@article{Yuan2026,
  author = {Yuan, Muzi and Lin, Honglei and Ma, Chunjiang and Ma, Pengcheng and Yu, Meiting and Tang, Xiaomei},
  title = {Design of AFDM Waveform Encryption for LEO Satellite Networks},
  journal = {Sensors},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {16},
  pages = {5282},
  doi = {10.3390/s26165282}
}
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