Adversarial Machine Learning in Industrial IoT: A Systematic Review of Attack Realism, Defense Trade-Offs, and Deployment Gaps
Sensors · 11.08.2026 · 26 (16) · 5098
DOI: 10.3390/s26165098 ↗Kurz gefasst
Übersichtsarbeit in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 11.08.2026. Verfasst von Abeer Alsaidlani und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Computer and Networks Engineering, College of Computing, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah 24382, Saudi Arabia. Die Arbeit nennt 88 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Umm al-Qura University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Modern Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) integrates machine learning models for monitoring and control. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial machine learning (AML) attacks, where an adversary adds small changes to the input data. These small changes degrade model quality, reduce accuracy, and can ultimately compromise the safety and security of the entire system. AML research in IIoT often focuses on individual attack types, defense methods, and datasets. Existing reviews lack a unified quantitative and system-level perspective. Therefore, a systematic literature review (SLR) is needed to provide a holistic analysis of existing attacks, defenses, and databases. This SLR analyzes 50 research articles to provide a holistic view of AML threats in IIoT systems and identifies seven distinct attack types: gradient-based perturbations, GAN-generated samples, poisoning attacks, reinforcement learning-based (RL) strategies, saliency-based feature manipulation, false data injection, and hybrid approaches. To illustrate the range of observed impacts, selected studies report the following degradation examples: saliency-based attacks cause accuracy reductions of 6–11 percentage points; iterative gradient attacks reduce accuracy from 95–99% to 30–40% in SIEM systems; and RL-based attacks reduce detection rates from 100% to 0% in rule-based IDS settings. In addition to the analysis of attack types, this SLR also evaluates current defense methods to protect IIoT systems. It has been observed that existing defense mechanisms lack generalization and require high computational resources. Moreover, the testing is performed under simplified threat models. The analysis of datasets further shows a clear gap between realistic industrial benchmarks (such as SWaT, WADI, and NSL-KDD) and synthetic datasets used for controlled experiments. By connecting attack behavior, defense performance, dataset characteristics, and system-level effects, this SLR identifies the key research gaps that must be addressed in future work.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Computer and Networks Engineering, College of Computing, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah 24382, Saudi Arabia.
ORCID-Profile: Abeer Alsaidlani, Muhammad Rashid, Malak Aljabri
Förderung
- Umm al-Qura University
Zitieren
APA
Alsaidlani, A., Rashid, M., & Aljabri, M. (2026). Adversarial Machine Learning in Industrial IoT: A Systematic Review of Attack Realism, Defense Trade-Offs, and Deployment Gaps. Sensors, 26(16), 5098. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26165098
Vancouver
Alsaidlani A, Rashid M, Aljabri M. Adversarial Machine Learning in Industrial IoT: A Systematic Review of Attack Realism, Defense Trade-Offs, and Deployment Gaps. Sensors. 2026;26(16):5098. doi:10.3390/s26165098
BibTeX
@article{Alsaidlani2026,
author = {Alsaidlani, Abeer and Rashid, Muhammad and Aljabri, Malak},
title = {Adversarial Machine Learning in Industrial IoT: A Systematic Review of Attack Realism, Defense Trade-Offs, and Deployment Gaps},
journal = {Sensors},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {16},
pages = {5098},
doi = {10.3390/s26165098}
}
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