EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Deconstructing Pilot Contamination Attacks: A Two-Stage Threat Model for MIMO Systems

Abdallah Farraj iD

Sensors · 04.08.2026 · 26 (15) · 4935

DOI: 10.3390/s26154935 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 04.08.2026. Verfasst von Abdallah Farraj. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Electrical Engineering, Texas A&M University-Texarkana, RELLIS Campus, Bryan, TX 77807, USA. Die Arbeit nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Pilot contamination attacks (PCAs) pose a great physical-layer threat to modern multiple-input–multiple-output (MIMO) systems by exploiting channel reciprocity to corrupt channel state information estimation. While existing literature acknowledges this vulnerability, precise parametric threat models that capture the transition from active channel estimation poisoning to data exploitation remain scarce. This article addresses this gap by developing a novel, physical-layer parameterized PCA framework structured as a two-stage operational attack: channel estimation poisoning and adaptive information contamination. We formulate an algorithmic attack strategy that systematically manipulates base transceiver station precoding and beamforming weights. This formulation allows us to quantify the precise degradation of the system through the lens of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) triad, specifically mapping the adversary’s security gains against legitimate users’ signal-to-noise ratio degradation. Finally, we leverage this parametric threat model to outline a qualitative roadmap of actionable detection vectors and structural mitigation strategies. The proposed algorithmic attack serves as an evaluation benchmark and an analytical baseline for conceptualizing resilient architectures in emerging physical-layer security frameworks.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

MIMOadversarial wireless communicationschannel estimationeavesdroppingparameterized threat modelingphysical-layer securitypilot contamination attackprecoding poisoning

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Electrical Engineering, Texas A&M University-Texarkana, RELLIS Campus, Bryan, TX 77807, USA.

ORCID-Profile: Abdallah Farraj

Zitieren

APA

Farraj, A. (2026). Deconstructing Pilot Contamination Attacks: A Two-Stage Threat Model for MIMO Systems. Sensors, 26(15), 4935. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26154935

Vancouver

Farraj A. Deconstructing Pilot Contamination Attacks: A Two-Stage Threat Model for MIMO Systems. Sensors. 2026;26(15):4935. doi:10.3390/s26154935

BibTeX
@article{Farraj2026,
  author = {Farraj, Abdallah},
  title = {Deconstructing Pilot Contamination Attacks: A Two-Stage Threat Model for MIMO Systems},
  journal = {Sensors},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {15},
  pages = {4935},
  doi = {10.3390/s26154935}
}
Kostenlos starten →