Game-Theoretic Obfuscation of Wi-Fi MAC-Layer Traffic Against IoT Device Fingerprinting Attacks
Sensors · 23.07.2026 · 26 (15) · 4690
DOI: 10.3390/s26154690 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 23.07.2026. Verfasst von Abdulmajeed Alghamdi und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Computer and Network Engineering, College of Computing, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah 24382, Saudi Arabia. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices in smart homes are vulnerable to passive traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary captures encrypted IEEE 802.11 frames and identifies devices using MAC-layer metadata such as packet sizes and inter-arrival times. Existing defenses based on padding, traffic shaping, or synthetic cover traffic can remain vulnerable because artificial timing signatures are detectable by machine learning classifiers. This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework for evaluating Wi-Fi MAC-layer cover-traffic injection defenses. We introduce donor-based mimicry injection, in which the access point injects a replica of a paired device’s authentic traffic into each device’s stream. We compare donor mimicry with fixed-rate, exponential, and uniform synthetic baselines across 198 scenario instances (156 unique defender configurations) and eight classifiers using 10-fold cross-validation. Donor mimicry at 100% bandwidth overhead reduces the best attacker’s balanced accuracy to 33.5%, whereas synthetic methods at equal overhead reach 93.9%, showing that behavioral realism, rather than injected volume alone, drives effectiveness. Modeling the interaction as a finite two-player zero-sum game yields a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with game value 0.247 within the evaluated strategy space; a deployable deterministic defense holds the best pairing-unaware attacker to 25.9% balanced accuracy, near the four-class random baseline of 25%. A pairing-aware robustness analysis shows that an attacker who can orient the donor-induced identity swap recovers near-baseline accuracy, so the four-class protection presumes pairing secrecy and the durable effect is pair-level anonymity. The defense operates at the access point and requires no IoT device modifications.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Computer and Network Engineering, College of Computing, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah 24382, Saudi Arabia.
- Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816, USA.
- Department of Computer Sciences, College of Engineering and Computer Sciences, Jazan University, Jazan 45142, Saudi Arabia.
- Civil Engineering Department, College of Engineering, Taif University, Taif 21944, Saudi Arabia.
- Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816, USA.
ORCID-Profile: Abdulmajeed Alghamdi, Mnassar Alyami, Inad Alqurashi, Cliff C Zou
Zitieren
APA
Alghamdi, A., Alyami, M., Alqurashi, I., & Zou, C. C. (2026). Game-Theoretic Obfuscation of Wi-Fi MAC-Layer Traffic Against IoT Device Fingerprinting Attacks. Sensors, 26(15), 4690. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26154690
Vancouver
Alghamdi A, Alyami M, Alqurashi I, Zou CC. Game-Theoretic Obfuscation of Wi-Fi MAC-Layer Traffic Against IoT Device Fingerprinting Attacks. Sensors. 2026;26(15):4690. doi:10.3390/s26154690
BibTeX
@article{Alghamdi2026,
author = {Alghamdi, Abdulmajeed and Alyami, Mnassar and Alqurashi, Inad and Zou, Cliff C},
title = {Game-Theoretic Obfuscation of Wi-Fi MAC-Layer Traffic Against IoT Device Fingerprinting Attacks},
journal = {Sensors},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {15},
pages = {4690},
doi = {10.3390/s26154690}
}
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