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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Lightweight User Equipment-Side Detection of False Base Station Attacks Using a First-Order Markov Chain

Hoonyong Park iD, Vincent Abella iD, Ilsun You iD

Sensors · 29.06.2026 · 26 (13) · 4116

DOI: 10.3390/s26134116 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 29.06.2026. Verfasst von Hoonyong Park und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: AUTOCRYPT Co., Ltd., Seoul 07241, Republic of Korea. Die Arbeit nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation, Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

False base station (FBS) attacks exploit the attach window before the network authenticates to the device. Existing User Equipment (UE)-side detectors typically need either labeled attack data, which is scarce and does not generalize to unseen attacks, or models too heavy for the resource budget of a smartphone or embedded endpoint. This study presents a lightweight UE-side detector built on a first-order Markov chain over a four-tuple state of packet type, direction, message identifier, and access-network type. A single counting pass fits the 119 KB chain, and thresholds are derived from normal traffic, so no attack labels are consulted. The capture path requires root and Qualcomm modem diagnostic access. Attacks surface as low-probability transitions, rare field values, and anomalous pacing, fused into a per session verdict with per-message attribution. On 192 commercial, testbed, and public LTE and 5G captures, the detector flags 51 of 53 attacks at an F1 of 88.70% in leakage-free leave-one-session-out evaluation and 96.23% once calibration covers the scored sessions. In five-fold cross-validation its F1 of 86.21% trails the strongest supervised baselines by margins that are not statistically significant, and it records the lowest latency (0.46 ms) and smallest working set (8.8 MB) among the eleven detectors benchmarked.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

5GLTEMarkov chainanomaly detectioncellular network securityfalse base stationuser equipment

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • AUTOCRYPT Co., Ltd., Seoul 07241, Republic of Korea.
  • Department of Information Security, Cryptology, and Mathematics, Kookmin University, Seoul 02707, Republic of Korea.
  • KMU Global Research Center for ICT Convergence Security, Kookmin University, Seoul 02707, Republic of Korea.

ORCID-Profile: Hoonyong Park, Vincent Abella, Ilsun You

Förderung

  • Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation
  • Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation

Zitieren

APA

Park, H., Abella, V., & You, I. (2026). Lightweight User Equipment-Side Detection of False Base Station Attacks Using a First-Order Markov Chain. Sensors, 26(13), 4116. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26134116

Vancouver

Park H, Abella V, You I. Lightweight User Equipment-Side Detection of False Base Station Attacks Using a First-Order Markov Chain. Sensors. 2026;26(13):4116. doi:10.3390/s26134116

BibTeX
@article{Park2026,
  author = {Park, Hoonyong and Abella, Vincent and You, Ilsun},
  title = {Lightweight User Equipment-Side Detection of False Base Station Attacks Using a First-Order Markov Chain},
  journal = {Sensors},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {13},
  pages = {4116},
  doi = {10.3390/s26134116}
}
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