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ÜbersichtsarbeitOpen Access · CC BY 4.0

A Survey on Air-Gap Attacks: Fundamentals, Transport Means, Attack Scenarios and Challenges

Jangyong Park, Jaehoon Yoo, Jaehyun Yu, Jiho Lee, JaeSeung Song iD

Sensors · 17.03.2023 · 23 (6) · 3215

DOI: 10.3390/s23063215 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Übersichtsarbeit in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 17.03.2023. Verfasst von Jangyong Park und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Convergence Engineering for Intelligent Drone, Sejong University, 206 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Gunja-dong, Seoul 05006, Republic of K…. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Agency for Defense Development Institute.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Major public institutions and organizations that handle sensitive data frequently enforce strong security policies by implementing network separation policies that segregates their internal work networks and internet network using air gaps to prevent the leakage of confidential information. Such closed networks have long been considered the most secure technique for protecting data; however, studies have shown that they are no longer effective in providing a safe data protection environment. Research on air-gap attacks remains in its infancy stage. Studies have been conducted to check the method and demonstrate the possibility of transmitting data using various transmission media available within the closed network. These transmission media include optical signals such as HDD LEDs, acoustic signals such as speakers, and the electrical signals of power lines. This paper examines various media used for air-gap attacks by analyzing different techniques and their essential functions, strengths, and limitations. The findings of this survey and the follow-up analysis aim to assist companies and organizations in protecting their information by providing an understanding of air-gap attacks and their current trends.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

air-gap attacksnetwork separationsecurityside-channel attacks

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Convergence Engineering for Intelligent Drone, Sejong University, 206 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Gunja-dong, Seoul 05006, Republic of Korea.

ORCID-Profile: JaeSeung Song

Förderung

  • Agency for Defense Development Institute

Zitieren

APA

Park, J., Yoo, J., Yu, J., Lee, J., & Song, J. (2023). A Survey on Air-Gap Attacks: Fundamentals, Transport Means, Attack Scenarios and Challenges. Sensors, 23(6), 3215. https://doi.org/10.3390/s23063215

Vancouver

Park J, Yoo J, Yu J, Lee J, Song J. A Survey on Air-Gap Attacks: Fundamentals, Transport Means, Attack Scenarios and Challenges. Sensors. 2023;23(6):3215. doi:10.3390/s23063215

BibTeX
@article{Park2023,
  author = {Park, Jangyong and Yoo, Jaehoon and Yu, Jaehyun and Lee, Jiho and Song, JaeSeung},
  title = {A Survey on Air-Gap Attacks: Fundamentals, Transport Means, Attack Scenarios and Challenges},
  journal = {Sensors},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {23},
  number = {6},
  pages = {3215},
  doi = {10.3390/s23063215}
}
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