Modeling Audit Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Delay and Fees
Risks · 09.02.2026 · 14 (2) · 35
DOI: 10.3390/risks14020035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Risks, online erschienen am 09.02.2026. Verfasst von Güler Ferhan Ünal Uyar und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study models the auditor–client relationship as a strategic game shaped by two-sided information asymmetry and examines how this structure influences key audit outcomes, namely audit delay and audit fees, in Türkiye. Using a game-theoretic framework complemented by empirical analysis, the study analyzes independent audit reports dated 31 December 2024 for 201 Borsa Istanbul firms audited by Big Four auditors. Two ordinary least squares models are estimated: one for audit delay and one for the logarithm of audit fees. The findings indicate that firm size and effort-related cost proxies play a central role in explaining audit fees, reflecting scale-related audit complexity. Financial risk, while not significantly associated with audit fees, is found to be negatively related to audit delay, suggesting that riskier firms may accelerate the reporting process through stronger monitoring, earlier planning, or tighter regulatory scrutiny. Audit opinion, by contrast, does not exhibit a statistically meaningful association with reporting delay, likely due to limited variation within the sample. Overall, the results partially support the risk–effort–cost mechanism proposed by the game-theoretic framework and highlight how institutional features of the Turkish audit market shape the relationship between risk and reporting timeliness. The study contributes to the literature by framing the audit process as a strategic decision environment and by providing updated evidence from an emerging market context.
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APA
Uyar, G. F. Ü., Terzioğlu, M., Kaya, N., & Bozcuk, A. E. (2026). Modeling Audit Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Delay and Fees. Risks, 14(2), 35. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks14020035
Vancouver
Uyar GFÜ, Terzioğlu M, Kaya N, Bozcuk AE. Modeling Audit Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Delay and Fees. Risks. 2026;14(2):35. doi:10.3390/risks14020035
BibTeX
@article{Uyar2026,
author = {Uyar, Güler Ferhan Ünal and Terzioğlu, Mustafa and Kaya, Neylan and Bozcuk, Aslıhan Ersoy},
title = {Modeling Audit Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Delay and Fees},
journal = {Risks},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {35},
doi = {10.3390/risks14020035}
}
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