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Governance of Toxic Metal Pollution in China’s Farmland Soil: A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis

Xinpei Qiao, Mengyue Xu, Xiao Fan, Jingyuan Sun, Yuchao Li

Processes · 10.07.2026 · 14 (14) · 2260

DOI: 10.3390/pr14142260 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Processes, online erschienen am 10.07.2026. Verfasst von Xinpei Qiao und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Fundamental Research Funds for the Universities of the Autonomous Region, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Research Foundation of China University of Petroleum-Beijing at Karamay.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Toxic metal pollution in farmland soils has become a critical environmental issue threatening land security and agricultural sustainability. This study develops an evolutionary game model involving the government, enterprises, the public, and environmental public-interest organizations to analyze the dynamic interactions underlying multi-actor governance. By combining equilibrium analysis with numerical simulations, the study examines the conditions for collaborative governance and the effects of key parameters on the system’s evolution. The results reveal a stage-based trajectory: weak regulation and limited participation in the early stage lead to persistent illegal discharge; strengthened government intervention and rising social participation in the transitional stage promote more coordinated supervision, although enterprises may still behave non-compliantly; in the mature stage, favorable cost–benefit conditions induce enterprises to adopt compliant treatment, reducing reliance on continuous external oversight. Further analysis shows that effective incentive and deterrence mechanisms are essential for activating multi-actor responses, while enterprises’ strategies are mainly driven by pollution-control costs, expected returns, and potential losses, and social participation depends on monitoring costs, expected benefits, and government support. Initial strategy distributions have limited influence on long-term outcomes. These findings provide policy-relevant insights for improving institutional design and strengthening collaborative governance in the management of toxic metal pollution in China’s farmland soils.

Förderung

  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Universities of the Autonomous Region
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
  • Research Foundation of China University of Petroleum-Beijing at Karamay
  • Outcomes of the 2025 General Project of Xinjiang Education Science Planning

Zitieren

APA

Qiao, X., Xu, M., Fan, X., Sun, J., & Li, Y. (2026). Governance of Toxic Metal Pollution in China’s Farmland Soil: A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis. Processes, 14(14), 2260. https://doi.org/10.3390/pr14142260

Vancouver

Qiao X, Xu M, Fan X, Sun J, Li Y. Governance of Toxic Metal Pollution in China’s Farmland Soil: A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis. Processes. 2026;14(14):2260. doi:10.3390/pr14142260

BibTeX
@article{Qiao2026,
  author = {Qiao, Xinpei and Xu, Mengyue and Fan, Xiao and Sun, Jingyuan and Li, Yuchao},
  title = {Governance of Toxic Metal Pollution in China’s Farmland Soil: A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis},
  journal = {Processes},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {14},
  pages = {2260},
  doi = {10.3390/pr14142260}
}
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