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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

How Tax–Subsidy Policies Shape Battery Recycling Strategies Under the Extended Producer Responsibility System

Yuling Sun, Siyu Yao, Shihan Qian, Shuting Wei

Mathematics · 24.08.2026 · 14 (17) · 3050

DOI: 10.3390/math14173050 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 24.08.2026. Verfasst von Yuling Sun und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Major Project of Philosophy and Social Sciences in Colleges and Universities of Jiangsu Province, National Social Science Fund of China Post-Grant Project, National Social Science Foundation of China.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

To address the increasing volume of end-of-life power batteries, governments leverage Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations to encourage battery suppliers to increase recycling. We develop a Stackelberg game model for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) that includes a government, a battery supplier, an NEV manufacturer, and a third-party recycler. The model endogenizes tax–subsidy decisions while incorporating cascade utilization, competitive intensity, and environmental damage from informal channels. We compare three recycling modes: manufacturer–supplier competition (MSC), manufacturer–third-party competition (MTC), and manufacturer–third-party alliance (MTA). Our analysis addresses three main issues. First, the structure of recycling modes affects the equilibrium decisions of CLSC members: pricing under MSC is governed by a threshold effect of cascade utilization, whereas pricing under MTC depends on relative cost differences. Second, higher cascade utilization strengthens the supplier’s pricing power under MSC, whereas intensified competition reduces the profits of the supplier and government under MSC and MTC; by contrast, the profits of the supplier and government under MTA remain stable. Third, environmental damage encourages the government to raise the subsidy level provided to suppliers for battery recycling. These findings offer practical guidance for designing adaptive EPR policies that balance economic and environmental objectives.

Förderung

  • Major Project of Philosophy and Social Sciences in Colleges and Universities of Jiangsu Province
  • National Social Science Fund of China Post-Grant Project
  • National Social Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Sun, Y., Yao, S., Qian, S., & Wei, S. (2026). How Tax–Subsidy Policies Shape Battery Recycling Strategies Under the Extended Producer Responsibility System. Mathematics, 14(17), 3050. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14173050

Vancouver

Sun Y, Yao S, Qian S, Wei S. How Tax–Subsidy Policies Shape Battery Recycling Strategies Under the Extended Producer Responsibility System. Mathematics. 2026;14(17):3050. doi:10.3390/math14173050

BibTeX
@article{Sun2026,
  author = {Sun, Yuling and Yao, Siyu and Qian, Shihan and Wei, Shuting},
  title = {How Tax–Subsidy Policies Shape Battery Recycling Strategies Under the Extended Producer Responsibility System},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {17},
  pages = {3050},
  doi = {10.3390/math14173050}
}
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