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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Open-End Fund Investment with Dynamic Fund Flows and Passive Benchmarking: A Continuous-Time Stackelberg Game

Yin Li, Yazhi Song, Can Zhou, Ruiyi Zhang

Mathematics · 20.08.2026 · 14 (16) · 3008

DOI: 10.3390/math14163008 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 20.08.2026. Verfasst von Yin Li und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Social Science Fund of China, National Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper develops a stylized continuous-time framework for open-end fund investment in which state-dependent fund flows, passive benchmarking, and strategic manager–investor interaction are modeled jointly. The contribution is not a new Stackelberg solution concept; rather, it is the economic mechanism created by combining a scale-dependent value-added objective with endogenous subscription and redemption jumps. Fund flows are represented by marked compound Poisson processes, and the manager acts as leader while a representative investor chooses participation as a follower. Under bounded controls, bounded Lipschitz jump intensities, admissible jump-size distributions, and strict-concavity conditions, we establish positivity and moment bounds for the state process, provide sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Markov feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, and state a jump-diffusion verification theorem. A transparent local feedback approximation and Monte Carlo robustness exercise illustrate how redemption pressure, subscription intensity, jump-size dispersion, benchmark volatility, and risk aversion affect active exposure and terminal fund wealth. The results show that stronger redemption pressure and benchmark-relative risk reduce active positions, whereas subscription incentives increase risk-taking only when expected value added compensates for flow-induced dilution. Within its stated assumptions, the model provides a tractable theoretical benchmark rather than an empirically validated structural model.

Förderung

  • National Social Science Fund of China
  • National Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities

Zitieren

APA

Li, Y., Song, Y., Zhou, C., & Zhang, R. (2026). Open-End Fund Investment with Dynamic Fund Flows and Passive Benchmarking: A Continuous-Time Stackelberg Game. Mathematics, 14(16), 3008. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14163008

Vancouver

Li Y, Song Y, Zhou C, Zhang R. Open-End Fund Investment with Dynamic Fund Flows and Passive Benchmarking: A Continuous-Time Stackelberg Game. Mathematics. 2026;14(16):3008. doi:10.3390/math14163008

BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
  author = {Li, Yin and Song, Yazhi and Zhou, Can and Zhang, Ruiyi},
  title = {Open-End Fund Investment with Dynamic Fund Flows and Passive Benchmarking: A Continuous-Time Stackelberg Game},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {16},
  pages = {3008},
  doi = {10.3390/math14163008}
}
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