EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Quality Investment and Green Disclosure Strategy in Competitive Supply Chains Considering Customer Trust

Yanan Yu, Zhihao Yin, Hongfu Huang

Mathematics · 05.08.2026 · 14 (15) · 2833

DOI: 10.3390/math14152833 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematics, online erschienen am 05.08.2026. Verfasst von Yanan Yu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province, Humanities and Social Sciences of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Purpose

This paper investigates how product quality and green information transparency jointly influence customer trust in green products and examines competing retailers’ green disclosure and suppliers’ quality investment strategies under information asymmetry. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model of two competing retailers and two suppliers with asymmetric quality investment costs. We characterize equilibrium outcomes in sequential disclosure games and study the effects of the trust factor and transparency level on the equilibrium outcomes.

Findings

Three main results emerge. First, a second-mover advantage exists in sequential disclosure, namely, the later retailer free-rides on the first mover’s information. Second, higher trust intensifies competition by homogenizing customer utility, whereas greater transparency softens competition by making valuations more heterogeneous. Third, customer trust can incentivize both retailers to disclose simultaneously. Novelty: First, this paper studies consumers’ heterogeneous green preferences and considers the information asymmetry of green attributes between supply and demand. Second, this paper determines the suppliers’ quality investment considering the retailers’ strategic green disclosure and constructs the endogenous trust function. Third, this paper analyzes the retailers’ green disclosure in equilibrium, further determines the market coverage, and points out the effects of key parameters on the market coverage and the product competition.

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province
  • Humanities and Social Sciences of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
  • Stitp Project of Tongda College, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications

Zitieren

APA

Yu, Y., Yin, Z., & Huang, H. (2026). Quality Investment and Green Disclosure Strategy in Competitive Supply Chains Considering Customer Trust. Mathematics, 14(15), 2833. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14152833

Vancouver

Yu Y, Yin Z, Huang H. Quality Investment and Green Disclosure Strategy in Competitive Supply Chains Considering Customer Trust. Mathematics. 2026;14(15):2833. doi:10.3390/math14152833

BibTeX
@article{Yu2026,
  author = {Yu, Yanan and Yin, Zhihao and Huang, Hongfu},
  title = {Quality Investment and Green Disclosure Strategy in Competitive Supply Chains Considering Customer Trust},
  journal = {Mathematics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {15},
  pages = {2833},
  doi = {10.3390/math14152833}
}
Kostenlos starten →